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THE LAW OF NONMARRIAGE 
ALBERTINA ANTOGNINI* 
Abstract: The meaning of marriage, and how it regulates intimate relationships, 
has been at the forefront of recent scholarly and public debates. Yet despite the at-
tention paid to marriage—especially in the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges—a record 
number of people are not marrying. Legal scholarship has mostly neglected how 
the law regulates these nonmarital relationships. This Article begins to fill the gap. 
It does so by examining how courts distribute property at the end of a relationship 
that was nonmarital at some point. This inquiry provides a descriptive account to a 
poorly understood and largely under-theorized area of the law. Analyzing property 
disputes offers a unique perspective: courts must assess the nature of the relation-
ship and assign a value to the contributions made by each party. Considering vari-
ous types of nonmarital relationships together—including unmarried couples who 
were also married at some point—shows that courts draw the line between mar-
riage and nonmarriage inconsistently. Some courts only distribute property at the 
end of a relationship that looked just like a marriage; other courts require the exact 
opposite, refusing to distribute property in a relationship that approached, but never 
became, a marriage. Despite these inconsistencies, one very clear trend emerges: 
the individual seeking property, who in nearly all cases is a woman, has a difficult 
time receiving anything outside of marriage. This analysis further reveals how 
courts actively define marriage in deciding whether and how to distribute property 
in relationships that are not marital. Given the problematic picture of modern mari-
tal and nonmarital relations that materializes, this Article calls for moving beyond 
the marriage-nonmarriage dyad in allocating property rights between individuals 
who are not, or have not been, married. 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ide-
als of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital un-
ion, two people become something greater than once they were. 
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—Obergefell v. Hodges1 
After decades of declining marriage rates and changes in family structure, 
the share of American adults who have never been married is at an historic 
high. 
—Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Pew Research Center2 
INTRODUCTION 
Marriage is the unmistakable protagonist of Obergefell v. Hodges, the Su-
preme Court’s long-awaited decision recognizing the right of same-sex couples 
to marry.3 In 2015, Justice Anthony Kennedy opened the opinion with an ap-
peal to the twin concepts of liberty and equality, culminating in its holding 
“that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the per-
son.”4 “[M]arriage,” according to the Court, “lies at the the foundation of gov-
ernment” and “transform[s] strangers into relatives, binding families and socie-
ties together.”5 Although “[t]he centrality of marriage”6 to Obergefell is under-
standable given the question before the Court, the exclusive role it is given is 
nonetheless striking. Where does divorce, which affects about half of all mar-
ried couples,7 figure into Obergefell’s account of marriage as “timeless”8 and 
“transcendent”?9 Further, where are the vast and increasing number of individ-
uals who are entering into relationships but declining to marry?10 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). 
 2 WENDY WANG & KIM PARKER, PEW RESEARCH CTR., RECORD SHARE OF AMERICANS HAVE 
NEVER MARRIED: AS VALUES, ECONOMICS, AND GENDER PATTERNS CHANGE (2014). 
 3 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 4 Id. at 2604. 
 5 Id. at 2594. On a more intimate register, “[m]arriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely 
person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding 
and assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the other.” Id. at 2600. 
 6 Id. at 2594 (stating that “[t]he centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurpris-
ing that the institution has existed for millennia and across civilizations”). 
 7 Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of Research in the 
2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 403, 405 (2010) (noting that although divorce rates have probably 
declined since their peak in the 1980s, “[n]early all studies suggest that the lifetime probability of 
disruption is between 40% and 50%”). 
 8 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for Children’s Fam-
ily Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 29 (2010) (identifying the various trends 
in the continuing increase in cohabitation); Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and 
Modeling Cohabitation: New Perspectives from Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 989 
(2005) (noting that “[c]ohabitation has become a normative part of the life course of young Ameri-
cans” and has “gone from a relatively uncommon experience to a commonplace one so rapidly”); see 
also Noah Feldman, Marriage Is a Right, Not an Obligation, BLOOMBERGVIEW (June 28, 2015), 
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Beginning this Article with Obergefell is in some ways a red herring: this 
Article is neither about Obergefell nor about the constitutional right to marry.11 
Instead, this Article starts with Obergefell precisely for what it omits—the in-
dividuals that remain in the shadow of its decision because they engage in sex-
ual, affective, and economic relationships outside of marriage.12 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Obergefell has understandably refocused scholarly atten-
tion onto the meaning of marriage and its repercussions for intimate relation-
ships.13 But this emphasis obfuscates the fact that marriage is not the sole place 
where lines are being drawn or relationships constructed. Rather, the line be-
tween marriage and nonmarriage, and the content ascribed to each, is being 
actively policed in the more mundane and routine cases that address and assess 
nonmarital relationships for purposes of distributing property. 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-28/marriage-is-a-right-not-an-obligation [https://
perma.cc/LDC6-LZW3] (“[H]istorically there have been many forms of human community that cared 
for people, from groups of hunter gatherers to close-knit relationship communities. Marriage is not 
necessarily the only solution to the existential problem of loneliness, assuming such a problem even 
exists.”). 
 11 Numerous scholars have and will address that opinion, its subject matter, and its repercussions, 
head-on. See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 
1544–55 (2016) (describing the contours of what a constitutional right not to marry would look like); 
Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015) 
(arguing that Obergefell v. Hodges is “a game changer for substantive due process jurisprudence”). 
 12 This Article invokes the term “shadow” in the way that Ariela Dubler has employed it to ad-
dress the regulation of unmarried women; in addition to its regulatory properties, this Article calls 
upon its obfuscating qualities, in that it renders something more difficult to discern. See Ariela R. 
Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the 
State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1645–46 (2003) (“If marriage has formally governed the legal rights and 
status of some women, other women have lived in the shadow of marriage, regulated by marriage’s 
normative framework even as they have inhabited terrain outside of its formal boundaries.”); Robert 
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (identifying the various ways that individuals who divorce “bargain in the 
shadow of the law” even in uncontested cases). 
 13 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 23, 28–30 (2015) (identifying the ways that Obergefell marginalizes nonmarital families 
by reifying the importance of marriage); Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 41, 41 (2015) (noting that the decision in Obergefell “is nothing if not a paean to a very tradi-
tional picture of marriage and its centrality in the social order” in exploring how states can offer dif-
ferent statuses beyond marriage); Serena Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of 
Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 127 (2015), http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Mayeri_Marraige-in-equality.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR7K-5G6K] (arguing 
that Obergefell “utterly disregards” the “struggle against laws and practices that penalized women 
who lived their lives outside of marriage”); Allison Anna Tait, The Return of Coverture, 114 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 99, 100 (2016), http://michiganlawreview.org/the-return-of-coverture/ 
[https://perma.cc/25EA-G665] (describing Obergefell as “subconsciously invok[ing] marriage as 
coverture,” relying on “conventional, historical tropes that construct marriage as a relationship of 
hierarchy, gender differentiation, and female disempowerment”). 
2017] The Law of Nonmarriage 5 
Scholars have undertaken the important tasks of critiquing the law’s fail-
ure to account for nonmarital couples,14 and arguing for the preservation of 
spaces outside of marriage.15 This Article is concerned with an antecedent 
question: how does the law currently regulate nonmarital relationships? Un-
married couples are poorly understood, not only as a matter of fact,16 but as a 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 221, 224 
(2010) (arguing that the current laws do not protect cohabitating families and that to remedy this prob-
lem a quasi-marriage status should be imposed after two years or the birth of a child); Erez Aloni, 
Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1299–1309 (2014) (revealing the asymmetrical 
recognition provided non-marital cohabiting relationships, which often bear the burdens but receive 
none of the benefits of marital relationships, with disproportionate effects on already vulnerable popu-
lations); Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1384 (2001) 
(identifying shortcomings in the law addressing cohabitants who “have no rights or obligations that 
arise by virtue of their shared life”); Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution 
and Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008) (identifying the legal response to cohabitation 
and arguing in favor of a cautious approach); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal 
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 202 (2015) (identifying the disjuncture 
between family life and family law and offering ways that family law can change to facilitate effective 
co-parenting). See generally June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55 (2016) 
(arguing that the law treats financial obligations differently than custodial obligations in the context of 
unmarried couples, and calling for a coherent approach that protects the autonomy of the individuals 
within nonmarital relationships); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207 (2016) (criticizing Obergefell for diminishing the constitutional protection 
for nonmarriage). 
 15 See Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and 
the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2006) (arguing for the recovery of McLaugh-
lin and Lawrence on their own terms, instead of in relation to marriage, in order to “function as a 
limited corrective to the law’s generally myopic view of marriage as the only form of sexual intimacy 
tied to one’s place in the public, constitutional order”); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2690 (2008) (beginning the task of “mapping the positive space of the mid-
dle ground—the gap—between criminalization and marriage”); Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost: 
How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 
305 (2013) (arguing that “[m]arriage equality need not and should not be the end of innovation and 
experimentation around the issue of relationship recognition” and calling for the acknowledgment 
“that for many, one paradigm does not fit all”); Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and (or 
After?) Marriage Equality, 42 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 547, 571–72 (2015) (arguing that the push for mar-
riage equality should not prevent the recognition of nonmarital families and identifying “the need to 
reconsider the extent to which a large number of government policies and programs rely on marriage 
as the exclusive mechanism of recognizing family structures”). 
 16 See BOWMAN, supra note 14, at 117 (“In sum, the propensity to cohabit clearly differs by race, 
ethnic group, and immigrant status within the United States, but both the meaning of cohabitation and 
motivations for embracing this status can differ widely by group.”); Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights 
of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers’ Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 
102 (1976) (“Not only are the members of these units diverse; equally variegated are the relationships 
they establish and the needs that they seek to fulfill within them.”). Some scholars argue that this very 
difficulty in defining them as a group explains their inability to attain legal protections. See Elizabeth 
S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family 
Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 360 (2015) (“Two interrelated features of cohabitation have 
impeded progress toward legal recognition and left cohabitants with few of the legal rights and duties 
conferred on protected families. First, the category of cohabitants includes a broad range of couples 
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matter of law. Given their ubiquity, a thicker description of how the law con-
ceives of nonmarital relationships is imperative.17  
To begin to understand how the law regulates unmarried couples, this Ar-
ticle looks at how courts address a couple’s relationship after it ends.18 Courts 
often only have occasion to consider claims in the relationship’s aftermath. 
Just as married couples divorce, unmarried couples separate, and these couples 
invoke the law when their relationships break apart. This entryway into the 
relationship provides a uniquely insightful perspective: courts must assess the 
nature of the relationship and assign a value to the contributions made by each 
party.19 Unsurprisingly perhaps, marriage continues to be crucial to the project 
of considering nonmarriage, by either analogy or distinction. This Article is 
thus in direct conversation with the scholarship that explores how the relation-
ship between marriage and nonmarriage is continuously constituted.20 
                                                                                                                           
with varying intentions for their relationships. . . . [Second, t]he decision not to marry when marriage 
is an option sends a confusing signal about the nature of cohabitants’ relationships and the extent to 
which they are defined by family-commitment norms.”). 
 17 See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS 
(1973) (undertaking anthropological studies through “thick description” in order to provide context, 
meaning, and sufficient details to, for example, differentiate a wink from a fake-wink from a twitch). I 
use Clifford Geertz’s term intentionally, although informally, as applied to law rather than culture. 
This Article seeks to engage in a more detailed and expansive analysis of the cases—describing both 
their facts and their reasoning—to better understand the law’s characterization and construction of 
nonmarital relationships and identify the consequences that those characterizations and constructions 
bring about. 
 18 Marvin v. Marvin, hailed as the first case to recognize the rights of non-marital couples, was 
decided in the context of a separation. See 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (holding that at the conclu-
sion of a seven-year nonmarital relationship, the plaintiff nevertheless has rights to the property accu-
mulated to that relationship based on contractual and equitable principles); see also Albertina Antog-
nini, Family Unity Revisited: Divorce, Separation, and Death in Immigration Law, 66 S.C. L. REV. 1, 
14 (2014) (identifying the separation of a cohabiting couple as the catalyst for recognizing those cou-
ples in the first instance). 
 19 This vantage point helps blur any lingering separate spheres idea that the family and the market 
are diametric opposites, with economic relations suited only for the latter, given that courts actively 
value contributions and work done in the context of family relations. See Janet Halley & Kerry Rit-
tich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of 
Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 756–57 (2010) (describing the rise of “the noto-
rious separate spheres” whereby “[p]roductive work for pay moved out of the home, both in social life 
and in legal taxonomy” thus turning “the dominant gender in the family . . . female,” which was “seg-
regat[ed] . . . and subordinat[ed] . . . to the masculine market”). See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Inti-
macy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005) (identifying how legal rules permit or 
prohibit economic exchange in intimate relationships, with particular attention to the distributive con-
sequences the legal rules effectuate). This is not to imply, of course, that courts do not adhere to this 
separate spheres view. 
 20 See Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship and the Le-
gal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 71–72 (2012) (arguing that in regu-
lating non-traditional forms of kinship, the law is actually expressing its normative ideals about mar-
riage, parenting, and procreation that it would otherwise be unable to do given constitutional barriers); 
Dubler, supra note 12, at 1655–56 (exploring the history of unmarried women and arguing that 
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Before proceeding, some notes on scope and terminology are in order. 
This Article takes as its data set the state law cases that consider nonmarital 
relationships for purposes of property distribution.21 The focus of this Article is 
on rules that regulate the rights of individuals as against each other, rather than 
vis-à-vis the state.22 In analyzing these relationships, it excludes couples who 
mistakenly believed they were married, along with couples who experience 
death rather than separation. The definition of “nonmarital” this Article em-
ploys tracks the definition courts use—it includes couples who are having, or 
could be having, sex with each other. Many, but not all, of these couples co-
habit.23 Evaluating these cases in tandem reveals a taxonomy of different cir-
cumstances in which courts address nonmarital relationships.24 That is, non-
marital couples are not just made up of individuals who never marry. They are 
also composed of individuals who lived together before getting married; they 
are those who continue to live with the partner they were once married to but 
now divorced from; they are those who are in a nonmarital relationship while 
receiving alimony payments from a prior marriage. 
The scope of this Article is further limited insofar as it necessarily ad-
dresses those couples that end up in court. As such, this Article focuses on het-
erosexual couples—they form the bulk of individuals who litigate their claims, 
and the lack of marriage cannot be explained by a lack of choice given that 
they have long had the right to marry.25 Moreover, many couples, including 
                                                                                                                           
“[d]espite the explicit boundaries between the legal rights of married and unmarried women, the law 
understood and constructed the social and legal status of many unmarried women in relation to mar-
riage”); Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and 
its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 144–46 (2014) (exposing the dialogic relation-
ship between marriage and nonmarriage and the constitutive role each played in forming the other). 
 21 Numerous Boolean search terms in Westlaw, mainly variations on “unmarried” & “property” 
& “separation,” yield relevant cases numbered in the 400s, after leaving aside those cases that discuss 
only divorce, or death, or implicate federal questions. 
 22 Other works have addressed state regulation of unmarried couples. See BOWMAN, supra note 
14, at 69–80 (discussing how some state statutes implement a practical understanding of the family in 
areas such as health care and tort claims, thus providing benefits to cohabitants); Courtney G. Joslin, 
Marital Status Discrimination 2.0, 95 B.U. L. REV. 805, 806 (2015) (addressing the various ways the 
law continues to discriminate based on marital status, or lack thereof, and arguing that marital status 
discrimination should be included in civil rights statutes). 
 23 Sex and cohabitation have a symbiotic relationship. See infra notes 105–161 and accompany-
ing text (addressing instances where courts use sex and cohabitation as a proxy for marriage). 
 24 Most scholarship addresses each type of nonmarital relationship separately. See generally 
Aloni, supra note 14 (addressing how nonmarital relationships figure in terminating alimony); Estin, 
supra note 14 (identifying the remedies available to unmarried couples when the relationship ends 
without differentiating the types of nonmarital relationships); Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 
WASH. L. REV. 1245 (2015) (considering premarital cohabitation in the context of same-sex divorces). 
 25 Indeed, many cases involving same-sex couples are at odds with the jurisdiction’s general ap-
proach, possibly based in part on the fact that marriage was not available to them. See, e.g., Cates v. 
Swain, No. 2010-CT-01939-SCT, 2013 WL 1831783, at *5 (Miss. June 27, 2013) (upholding a prop-
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those without assets or those who were able to agree upon a division of assets, 
are not represented.26 The rules announced in court, however, provide the net-
work of laws against which all couples make their decisions—they apply to 
nonmarital couples from lower socioeconomic backgrounds27 as they do to the 
increasing number of wealthier elderly adults opting to forego marriage.28  
The survey of the case law reveals that courts approach nonmarital rela-
tionships in one of two ways: either by looking to marriage as a requirement 
for what a nonmarital relationship should be, or by distinguishing the nonmari-
tal relationship from anything approaching marriage. In the process, the cases 
reinforce particular conceptions of what individuals in relationships across the 
board ought to do, and how their contributions are valued.29 By defining each 
nonmarital relationship differently, courts value the contributions made by 
each party to the relationship differently, but with a remarkably consistent re-
sult: the individual seeking property—which in nearly all cases is a woman30—
has a difficult time receiving anything outside of marriage. In deciding whether 
and how to distribute property in a relationship that is not marital, courts gen-
erally enforce a rule that recognizes title to property, over and above non-
monetary contributions made to the relationship. This prioritization of paid 
work over house work has its roots in coverture, the doctrine that rendered the 
wife legally invisible upon marriage.31 Although many scholars convincingly 
                                                                                                                           
erty distribution on the basis of unjust enrichment at the conclusion of a same-sex relationship while 
Mississippi generally does not allow claims of unjust enrichment to go forward in the context of non-
marital couples); Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) rev’d in part, vacated in 
part by Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, 2016 WL 6235511, *13–16 (Ill. Aug. 18, 2016)  (apply-
ing unjust enrichment to a same-sex unmarried couple). The cases operate in specifically gendered 
ways given the composition of the parties before the court and the claims they raise. 
 26 Those with many assets may also not be represented, given that Americans with higher income 
and level of education not only get married in larger numbers but they also tend to stay married. See 
Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and Social Security in the 
Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 720–22 (2013) (noting that as a group, the “American 
upper class” marries later in life, marries at higher rates, and tends to remain married). 
 27 BOWMAN, supra note 14, at 107 (noting that some scholars refer to cohabitation as “a poor 
man’s and woman’s marriage”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 28 Id. at 119 (noting that these older cohabitants “are primarily persons who have been divorced 
or widowed, and they tend for a variety of reasons not to be interested in remarriage, reasons extend-
ing beyond economic incentives and family pressures”). 
 29 This analysis may thus be relevant to unmarried same-sex couples. Even while same-sex cou-
ples tend to be dual income-earners, there is evidence to show that same-sex couples still “adopt de-
fault patterns of specialized labor within the household, even while preferring a narrative of equality 
within marriage.” See, e.g., Tait, supra note 24, at 1268–71 (identifying that in the context of mar-
riage, “[a]s with different-sex couples, there are a number of factors that produce and maintain power 
as well as gender”). 
 30 This gender composition is borne out in nearly every case that deals with property division 
between nonmarital couples. 
 31 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *442. 
2017] The Law of Nonmarriage 9 
argue that remnants of coverture still impact the marital relationship to this 
day,32 few have considered how the legal rules that regulate nonmarital rela-
tionships actively work to support the vitality of a doctrine that renders a 
woman’s work within the home invisible.33 This Article does just that: it shows 
how the law uses the nonmarital space to stipulate, and evaluate, the duties a 
woman owes, in her role as a wife. It also identifies the few instances where 
courts allow property distribution to coexist with sex outside of marriage, de-
spite the pitfalls of accidentally sanctioning prostitution:34 when courts rely 
exclusively on marriage to define the nonmarital relationship, and when ac-
knowledging sex outside of marriage leads to a decrease in property distribu-
tion for the woman. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by addressing where and 
how the law treats nonmarriage explicitly and exclusively through the familiar 
lens of marriage.35 In these situations, courts require the nonmarital relation-
ship to look just like a marriage before awarding property. In the process, a 
specific definition of marriage and its attendant duties, emerges. Part II then 
turns to those cases that approach the nonmarital relationship on its own 
terms.36 In many ways, these cases are the mirror image of those discussed in 
Part I—instead of requiring the relationship to be marriage-like before distrib-
uting property, these cases deny property distribution where the relationship 
looks most like a marriage, or where the services for which the plaintiff seeks 
compensation are those that should be rendered in the course of a marriage. 
Because the plaintiff is nearly always a woman, these cases tend to revolve 
around the wife’s duties. Regardless of the court’s approach or of the final out-
come, all of the cases re-inscribe the same wifely obligations: she must provide 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 842–48 (2004) 
(discussing how the family law canon overstates changes over time and obscures the remnants of 
coverture in defining the marital relationship); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status 
Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2201–03 (1994) (trac-
ing the history of how courts continued to enforce the substance of coverture under the more modern 
guise of “separate spheres” in marital relationships in the early twentieth century). 
 33 See Dubler, supra note 12, at 1712 (“To understand the meaning of marriage today, then, still 
demands attention to the legal regulation of life outside of marriage.”); Siegel, supra note 32, at 2210 
(powerfully noting in the context of marriage “[w]e live in a world in which unwaged labor in the 
home stands as an anomaly: lacking explanation but not requiring one either”). 
 34 The general understanding is that courts try to keep sex separate from any sort of exchange in 
nonmarital relationships. See Hasday, supra note 19, at 511 (“The law regulating unmarried sexual 
partners conspicuously denies enforcement to some economic exchanges between intimates in order to 
stress and preserve the distinction between nonmarital sexual relationships and prostitution, while 
simultaneously sanctioning other economic exchanges that the courts understand to accord with, or 
even advance, appropriate differentiation between nonmarital sexual relationships and marriage.”). 
 35 See infra notes 39–160 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 161–309 and accompanying text. 
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sex, along with homemaking services, and at times even help with her hus-
band’s business ventures. 
Part III isolates a theme underlying the cases that address nonmarital rela-
tionships: they all reason that their decisions promote and protect the status of 
marriage.37 This Part takes up that rationale directly and evaluates it by consid-
ering how it justifies outcomes in both cases that decide to distribute property 
and those that deny it entirely. In each instance the justification comes up 
wanting. In fact, courts are most directly protecting and promoting the rules of 
divorce, rather than those of marriage, by refusing to apply the rules of divorce 
to the couples who are before them. Although there may be a reasoned basis 
for doing so, courts have so far failed to develop any account of why that 
would be. In particular, they fail to explain how the rules regulating exit impact 
the initial decision of whether to marry or not. This Part ends by unpacking the 
more specific incentives the rules that distribute or deny property create de-
pending on which party—the man or the woman—declines marriage according 
to the court. 
Lastly, Part IV gathers the shortcomings identified in the prior sections 
that afflict the law of nonmarriage.38 Even though the line between marriage 
and nonmarriage is a moving target, the end result is remarkably consistent: if 
a woman seeks property in exchange for services, then she should marry. Giv-
en the quantifiable harms these decisions inflict on the woman, and the weak 
rationales they rely on, this Part calls for judges and lawmakers to move be-
yond the marriage-nonmarriage dyad in deciding whether, and how, to distrib-
ute property. Ultimately, this Article aims to provide the necessary first step in 
bringing nonmarital family structures out from marriage’s lingering shadow. 
I. NONMARRIAGE IS (JUST LIKE) MARRIAGE 
In assessing nonmarital relationships, courts at times revert to the familiar 
form and status of marriage. Specifically, courts rely on marriage as the rele-
vant unit of analysis in determining whether to: award palimony; apply the 
laws of divorce to a couple that is not married; include a nonmarital period in 
distributing property where a couple had also been married; or terminate ali-
mony payments on the basis of an ex-spouse’s new, nonmarital relationship. 
This Part takes up each category of cases in turn. 
The decisions that explicitly rely on marriage exemplify the concept of 
copy as homage that Ariela Dubler meticulously explores in her history of 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See infra notes 312–344 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 345–356 and accompanying text. 
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common law marriage.39 As her work explains, relationships that looked like 
marriage were either identified as “a fraud” and “exclud[ed] from the legal 
sphere of domestic relations,” or they were “enlisted (or, perhaps, co-opted) to 
reinforce the supremacy of marriage.”40 These cases fall into the latter catego-
ry: by requiring the relationships to approximate marriage as much as possible, 
they are essentially assimilating nonmarriage into marriage. It should come as 
no surprise then that courts in this context are not concerned about how their 
decisions may negatively impact marriage; quite the opposite, they are expand-
ing the content of marriage to include nonmarital relationships. 
Courts’ reliance on marriage as the yardstick to distribute property, how-
ever, quickly becomes tautological: courts decline to distribute property in a 
nonmarital relationship, reasoning that the absence of an actual marriage 
makes it insufficiently marriage-like. The effect of these decisions therefore is 
to narrow the kinds of nonmarital relationships in which a court distributes 
property. There is, however, one important exception to this trend: where 
courts entertain requests to terminate alimony. In these cases, courts have a 
much lower bar in concluding that a nonmarital relationship approximates 
marriage. As long as there is evidence of sex, courts liken the relationship to 
one of marriage in holding that it leads to support, thus effectively denying the 
woman the actual payments of support she was receiving. 
A. Palimony: Concerns Over Bigamy 
Courts and commentators are liberal in their use of the term palimony 
when discussing property claims between individuals in a nonmarital couple.41 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
957, 1013–14 (2000). Dubler discusses the shift in understanding of common law marriage as homage 
to common law marriage as threat: 
Rather than framing copies of marriage as reinforcing the institution, legislators em-
braced a paradigm of parody in which copying constituted subversion. From within this 
conceptual framework, lawmakers posited that the preservation of marriage depended 
on exposing the copier as a fraud, and excluding from the legal sphere of domestic rela-
tionships those relationships that merely looked like marriage. 
Id. at 1014. In the context of same-sex marriage, however, Clare Huntington argues that nontraditional 
families had to mimic traditional families to gain recognition. See Clare Huntington, Staging the Fam-
ily, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 629 (2013) (addressing the performativity of family law and arguing that 
in the context of same-sex couples, “to gain legal recognition, nontraditional families must closely 
follow a prescribed script for how families are supposed to act,” which advocates for marriage equali-
ty incorporated into their litigation strategy). 
 40 Dubler, supra note 39, at 1013–14. 
 41 The original aggregation of claims in Marvin may explain the slippage that currently takes 
place in using the term palimony. Michelle Triola went to court to request both a division of property 
and post-relationship support from the defendant, Lee Marvin. She “allege[d] that the parties agreed to 
pool their earnings, that they contracted to share equally in all property acquired, and that defendant 
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This Article addresses palimony in its more specific iteration—as a form of 
alimony for “pals.”42 Accordingly, this section considers the cases where 
courts address requests for post-relationship support, as opposed to real and 
personal property division.43 The few courts that allow these claims for pali-
mony to go forward not only accept that a nonmarital relationship may approx-
imate a marital relationship, but require that it do so. By considering whether a 
nonmarital relationship is sufficiently like marriage, these cases define what 
marriage ought to look like. More precisely, they define what kinds of duties 
are appropriate for a wife. 
New Jersey and California are the two principal jurisdictions known for 
openly recognizing requests for palimony. Both, however, retain marriage as 
the principal relationship status. In 1979, in Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey explained that its decision recognizing palimony 
neither challenged nor denigrated marriage; quite the opposite, the court af-
firmed “[t]he value of a stable marriage.”44 California also recognizes claims 
for palimony and requires only that the agreement for support not rest on “un-
lawful consideration.”45 Marriage, nonetheless, remains California’s preferred 
status. As the California Supreme Court explained in Marvin v. Marvin, in 
1976, “the structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of 
                                                                                                                           
agreed to support plaintiff.” Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116. Although Marvin itself never used the term 
“palimony,” widespread lore suggests that Marvin was the source of the term and responsible for its 
rise in popular consciousness. See, e.g., Estin, supra note 14, at 1381 (noting that plaintiff’s “lawyer, a 
Los Angeles divorce attorney named Marvin Mitchelson, was interviewed by a Newsweek reporter, 
who coined the term ‘palimony’ for her claims”). It is unclear whether the term was coined by the 
lawyer or by the writer interviewing him. As one L.A. Times writer explained: “Domestic partner post-
dissolution support doesn’t have quite the ring of ‘palimony,’ a felicitous pairing of pal and alimony 
that was coined by either Mitchelson or a Newsweek writer interviewing him. (It would not have been 
out of character for the attorney to claim credit for someone else’s creation.).” Mimi Avins, On Mitch-
elson, Palimony and Contractual Obligations, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2004), http://articles.
latimes.com/2004/sep/21/entertainment/et-avins21 [https://perma.cc/Q46G-KKW2]. 
 42 See Myrna Oliver, ‘Marvin’ Cases Hard to Win: Palimony Proves to Be an Elusive Pot of Gold, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-01-30/news/mn-2067_1_palimony/2 
[https://perma.cc/6AQC-XAE5] (identifying the source of the term palimony, which was “coined 
from ‘alimony for pals’ by a Newsweek writer” interviewing the lawyer for Michelle Triola). 
 43 The definition of palimony has even been the subject of some litigation. See Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n of Md. v. Ficker, 572 A.2d 501, 507 (Md. 1990) (finding that an attorney did not mislead his 
clients by soliciting palimony claims because palimony “is [] a legitimate word fairly used in a broad 
sense . . . as referring to the collective rights of unmarried cohabitants”). Discussions addressing non-
marital couples generally fail to differentiate between the different claims for property. See Erez 
Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 587–91 (2013) (discussing the legal options 
available to nonmarital couples, without differentiating between request for palimony and requests to 
divide tangible property); Estin, supra note 14, at 1383–84 (discussing palimony and cohabitation 
without distinguishing between the two). 
 44 Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 908 (N.J. 1979), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 25:1-5 (2013), as recognized in Maeker v. Ross, 99 A.3d 795 (N.J. 2014).  
 45 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 116. 
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marriage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to derogate 
from that institution.”46 
Marriage remains central to the decisions in another way. In Kozlowski, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court had occasion to address multiple relationships. 
Thaddeus Kozlowski was married during the entire time he cohabited with his 
nonmarital partner, Irma Kozlowski.47 This fact did not prevent the court from 
finding that an oral promise had been made in the course of Thaddeus and Ir-
ma’s fifteen-year relationship, which had “an atmosphere not dissimilar to that 
of a normal family unit.”48 The court held that the agreement for support was 
based on a legitimate exchange for the value of the services provided by Irma, 
which included: “to take care of defendant, his children and his home; to cook 
and keep house for him, and to help entertain his friends and business associ-
ates.”49 The court had little trouble concluding that these services merited re-
muneration, as they occurred in the context of “a stable family relationship 
extending over a long period of time.”50 In deciding that palimony should be 
awarded to Irma, the court reasoned that even though this particular relation-
ship coexisted alongside a marital one, it looked sufficiently like a marriage, 
and the services were of the kind that would be provided during the course of a 
marriage.51 
California courts often look to whether the parties cohabited prior to 
awarding palimony as a proxy for deciding whether the relationship approach-
es the tenor of marriage. Their stated reason for doing so is to avoid sanction-
ing prostitution—instead of recognizing sexual services, they recognize cohab-
itation as the basis for the property award.52 Their actual concern, however, is 
whether the woman acted sufficiently like a wife. In denying recovery to Birgit 
Bergen in Bergen v. Wood, in 1993, the California Court of Appeal relied on 
the fact that she did not cohabit with her partner, Duane Wood.53 The court 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 122. 
 47 Kozlowski, 403 A.2d at 904. Thaddeus only began his divorce proceedings when he met the 
woman for whom he would leave Irma. By the time of trial, he was married to the new woman, whom 
the court mentioned was “at least 30 years younger than plaintiff.” Id. at 905. 
 48 Id. at 904. 
 49 Id. at 908. 
 50 Id. (noting that Marvin was persuasive in this context where “plaintiff has alleged facts which 
demonstrate a stable family relationship extending over a long period of time”). 
 51 Id. at 907–08 (noting that a promise to marry was not provided or alleged and that it was not 
recognizing, or reviving, the doctrine of common law marriage). 
 52 See Hasday, supra note 19, at 507 (noting that “courts are intent on distinguishing nonmarital 
sexual relationships from prostitution and so ardently declare their refusal to enforce contracts be-
tween unmarried sexual partners that use sex as consideration”). 
 53 Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 77 (Ct. App. 1993) (reasoning that cohabitation provides 
lawful consideration for a contract for support). 
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clarified that cohabitation itself was not a prerequisite to awarding palimony;54 
rather, living together is useful because it provides a source from which “flows 
the rendition of domestic services.”55 The court in Bergen specified, however, 
that only certain services are considered appropriately domestic. Despite the 
fact that the trial court below had concluded that Birgit’s “services as a social 
companion and hostess were adequate consideration,”56 the court on appeal 
disagreed. It reasoned that unlike the services provided a “homemaker, house-
keeper and cook,” being a “companion and hostess” are not “normally com-
pensated and are inextricably intertwined with a sexual relationship.”57 Ac-
cordingly, the court defined marital-like relations, and thus marriage, to in-
clude more than mere “companionship.”58 
Because the nonmarital relationship must approximate marriage so close-
ly prior to awarding palimony, some courts express a concern over inadvert-
ently sanctioning bigamy. This worry is heightened by the fact that the palimo-
ny cases can involve more than one relationship—one or both of the parties 
may have been married at some point to other individuals.59 This is precisely 
how the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals framed the issue in 1990 in 
Thomas v. LaRosa: instead of deciding whether to award palimony—which 
was the certified question submitted to the court—it set out to consider wheth-
                                                                                                                           
 54 Id. In 2001, the California Court of Appeal in Cochran v. Cochran clarified that full-time co-
habitation is not necessarily a prerequisite to palimony. 89 Cal. App. 4th 283, 293 (Ct. App. 2001). It 
identified, however, the function that cohabitation served—namely, as a proxy for “a significant and 
stable relationship.” Id. (holding that couple who lived together two to four days a week was sufficient 
to create a triable issue of fact). 
 55 Bergen, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77. 
 56 Id. Both Bergen and Taylor v. Fields, a 1986 case from the California Court of Appeal that also 
involved consideration in the context of a nonmarital relationship, were cases brought by Marvin 
Mitchelson, the lawyer for Michelle Triola in Marvin. See id. at 75; Taylor v. Fields, 178 Cal. App. 3d 
653, 656 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 57 Bergen, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 76, 78. The trial court had concluded that the sexual services were 
“collateral to the companionship of the parties.” Id. at 76. The plaintiff, Bergen, “was a beautiful 
woman and Wood [the defendant] wanted to be seen with her.” Id. 
 58 Id. at 859. The court in Bergen also expressed a concern over having any casual relationship 
lead to a request for palimony: “if cohabitation were not a prerequisite to recovery, every dating rela-
tionship would have the potential for giving rise to such claims, a result no one favors.” Id. at 858. To 
prevent the floodgates of litigation from opening according to the court, the relationship must closely 
approximate marriage. Even federal courts that address claims of palimony consider how marital-like 
the relationship is for purposes of federal jurisdiction or application of the federal bankruptcy code. 
See, e.g., In re Doyle, 70 B.R. 106, 107 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (finding that palimony is not alimony 
in declining to apply provisions of the bankruptcy code); Anastasi v. Anastasi, 544 F. Supp. 866, 868 
(D. N.J. 1982) (finding that a claim of palimony falls under the domestic relations exception to juris-
diction). 
 59 In these cases, palimony may be the only claim available, given that there may not be any real 
property to share, as there was no steady cohabitation. Those jurisdictions that allow palimony claims 
to go forward may therefore receive a disproportionate number of claims that involve multiple rela-
tionships because it is not clear what other legal recourse such individuals would have. 
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er “a man can now be married to two women at the same time.”60 The court 
said no.61 
In Thomas, the similarity between the nonmarital relationship and the 
marital one was what defeated any possibility for recovery. The court denied 
the plaintiff any property because it reasoned that she provided services that a 
wife would or should, which the court defined to include business advice: 
“[t]he type of ‘business consulting services’ appellant alleges that she per-
formed—namely, chewing the fat with the appellant over the advisability of 
certain business decisions—are typical of the services performed by most 
wives who are in the good graces of their husbands.”62 It defined the litany of 
wifely duties to encompass business-related services, which it had no difficulty 
differentiating from a “legitimate business contract[]” as among “a female coal 
broker and a male mine operator.”63 As such, the only damages the court iden-
tified were “those to which a faithful wife would be entitled upon the dissolu-
tion of a valid marriage,” which was missing here.64 
The Thomas court simultaneously demarcated marriage as the sole place 
where an exchange of services for property could take place and defined what 
kinds of services the wife should provide. It therefore found that enforcing a 
contract for services that the court identified were fit for a wife “when one par-
ty is already married would amount to the condonation of bigamy.”65 Marriage 
can provide support to only one woman at a time.66 Read another way, to re-
ceive support at the conclusion of a relationship, even one that involved busi-
ness dealings, a woman should secure her rights by getting married. 
Marriage remains the preferred status in cases that recognize claims to 
palimony in this important way then: relying on the markers of marriage to 
determine whether to award palimony turns into a requirement that has the ef-
fect of keeping marriage the principal locale for receiving any support pay-
ments when a relationship ends. That is, by hinging recovery on a relationship 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 810 (W. Va. 1990). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 814. 
 63 Id. The business related services the plaintiff had performed included traveling extensively 
with the defendant, scoping out potential business to be included in the construction of a mall, and 
acting generally as a “business assistant.” Id. at 811. 
 64 Id. at 814. 
 65 Id. 
 66 The court was ultimately concerned with the zero-sum proposal of a husband supporting more 
than one woman at a time—“if a man attempts to support more than one wife or more than one family 
at a time the living standard of the lawful wife must suffer as a matter of law.” Id. at 815. This is also 
the concern articulated by courts considering whether alimony payments should be terminated on 
account of a new relationship—there, courts identify one man per woman although they care less 
about whether the relationship is marital. See infra notes 122–134 and accompanying text (addressing 
how various courts determine alimony where there is a new relationship). 
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that looks as much as possible like a marriage, courts make recovery difficult 
outside of an actual marriage. Legislatures have followed a similar tack. In 
2010, New Jersey amended its statute to hold that a claim for palimony could 
only be actionable if the agreement was in writing.67 For the law to recognize 
the value of the services provided, the exchange must be express, and the par-
ties represented by counsel.68 Not only does the substance of the relationship 
need to approach marriage, but so do the formalities: instead of saying “I do,” 
the individuals must sign a contract stating how much they actually “do.” 
B. Marital Property Rights for Nonmarital Couples “By Analogy” 
A limited number of states—two—apply the rules regulating property dis-
tribution at divorce to the end of a nonmarital relationship.69 They are Nevada 
and Washington, and both apply the rules “by analogy” only.70 Courts in these 
jurisdictions provide individuals who are not married with rights similar to 
couples who do marry depending on the course the relationship took, thereby 
extending marriage’s reach into relationships that are manifestly not marital. 
Nevada and Washington are careful to apply the laws of divorce solely 
“by analogy” given that property distribution at divorce is a creature of stat-
ute.71 Such statutes do not mention unmarried couples, but neither do they pre-
clude property distribution between unmarried couples.72 In Washington, as in 
                                                                                                                           
 67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5(h) (West 2013) (prohibiting bringing an action to enforce “[a] prom-
ise by one party to a non-marital personal relationship to provide support or other consideration for 
the other party”); see Maeker, 99 A.3d at 797 (addressing the statutory amendment that prohibited oral 
palimony agreements). 
 68 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5(h). 
 69 Washington makes a distinction between separate property and community property and ap-
plies divorce rules only to community property. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 
1995) (“we limit the distribution of property following a meretricious relationship to property that 
would have been characterized as community property had the parties been married”). The distinction 
is not, of course, an analytically clean one, in that it may become a proxy for assessing the type of 
relationship, instead of the type of property. See Soltero v. Wimer, 150 P.3d 552, 556 (Wash. 2007) 
(denying recovery based on the conclusion that the nine-year long relationship did not involve any 
community property). 
 70 See W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (Nev. 1992); Connell, 898 P.2d at 
836. 
 71 Both states are community property states. See Black's Law Dictionary 338 (West 10th ed 
2014) (defining “community-property state” and noting that there are currently nine community prop-
erty states). 
 72 Michoff, 840 P.2d at 1224 (noting that unmarried cohabitating couples may lawfully contract 
with one another regarding their property in the same manner that married couples do); Connell, 898 
P.2d at 836 (“We hold income and property acquired during a meretricious relationship should be 
characterized in a similar manner as income and property acquired during marriage.”). In 1995, in 
Connell v. Francisco, the first case to address the issue in Washington relied on In re Lindsey, which 
considered a nonmarital relationship that took place prior to the couple’s marriage. Connell, 898 P.2d 
at 834; In re Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 329 (Wash. 1984). The question of what property rights follow 
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Nevada, the fact that the individuals have not married does not foreclose the 
equitable division of property at the conclusion of their relationship—it just 
forecloses the direct application of the state’s divorce laws. 
 Using the rules of divorce to address unmarried couples who separate 
brings them more directly into marriage’s orbit. Not only do courts apply the 
same rules to each relationship at the moment of exit, they also rely on mar-
riage to guide the decision of whether to apply the rules of divorce to nonmari-
tal relationships in the first instance. Increasingly, courts in each jurisdiction 
turn to the lack of an actual marriage to deny couples the application of the 
divorce laws. The Nevada Supreme Court used to define the nonmarital rela-
tionship generally, and flexibly. In 1984 in Hay v. Hay, the aim of the court’s 
inquiry was to protect the parties’ “reasonable expectations with respect to 
transactions concerning property rights.”73 As such, in Hay, the court based the 
decision to distribute property between individuals in an unmarried couple 
“with consideration given to the purpose, duration and stability of the relation-
ship and the expectations of the parties.”74 Since its decision in 1992 in West-
ern States Construction, Inc. v. Michoff, however, Nevada asks whether the 
parties agreed, expressly or impliedly, “to hold their property as though they 
were married,” before applying divorce rules by analogy.75 
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court, after Connell v. Francisco in 
1995, has been reluctant to deem a relationship sufficiently marital-like to war-
rant application of the divorce laws, even by analogy. Although lower courts 
have not completely stopped finding meretricious relationships,76 the tendency 
has been to import the characteristics of marriage into a nonmarital relation-
ship wholesale.77 The court in In re Marriage of Pennington in 2000, distilled 
Connell’s inquiry into a five-factor test, which includes consideration of the 
“continu[ity] [of the] cohabitation, [the] duration of the relationship, [the] pur-
                                                                                                                           
from a nonmarital relationship was therefore understood, initially, within the context of a subsequent 
marriage. See infra notes 162–247 and accompanying text (discussing how nonmarital relationships 
that take place before marriage figure in determining a particular property distribution). 
 73 Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 1984); see also Michoff, 840 P.2d at 1224 (holding that 
property may be distributed among unmarried couples if they lawfully contracted to do so). 
 74 Hay, 678 P.2d at 674. 
 75 Michoff, 840 P.2d at 1224. 
 76 See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Bailey, No. 66029-2-I, 2012 WL 5292816, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 
2012) (distinguishing Pennington and applying community law property rules to a meretricious rela-
tionship); Fenn v. Lockwood, No. 33595-6-II, 2006 WL 3629147, at *8 (Wash Ct. App. Dec. 12, 
2006) (applying community property rules to a meretricious relationship); Chen v. Shulman, No. 
54402-1-I, 2005 WL 2002154, at *5 (Wash Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2005) (overturning lower court’s sum-
mary judgment based on its conclusion that there was no meretricious relationship); Rota v. Vandver, 
No. 25039-0-II, 2001 WL 1521996, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001) (applying the rules regard-
ing equitable dissolution to a meretricious relationship). 
 77 See Huntington, supra note 13, at 23–24 (discussing the ways that legal opinions can reify the 
definitions of marriage in either a conservative, or progressive, manner). 
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pose of the relationship, [the] pooling of resources . . . , and the intent of the 
parties.”78 Considering the five factors, the court in Pennington denied a 
twelve-year-long couple the “meretricious” designation.79 It reasoned that the 
individuals had dated other people at times throughout their relationship and 
did not continuously cohabit. Moreover, the intent of the parties to the relation-
ship did not match up—the court found that the woman wanted to be married 
while the man did not.80 
The court’s conclusion in Pennington rested in part on the absence of an 
actual marriage: the woman’s unfulfilled desire to marry led the court to con-
clude that the intent of the parties was not to be in a stable, marriage-like rela-
tionship.81 The effect of the decision is to restrict the application of the laws of 
divorce to those relationships that are most marital-like: indeed, some courts 
arguably require that there be a marriage. As long as there is no actual mar-
riage, the court will not impose any responsibilities when the relationship 
ends.82 
C. Marriage and Nonmarriage: One Continuous Whole 
Marriage figures in a more literal manner in decisions where the individ-
uals in a nonmarital relationship have also been married. In addressing premar-
ital relationships and nonmarital relationships between marriages, some courts 
subsume the period of nonmarriage within the overarching arc of marriage, 
and include it for purposes of property distribution.83 Overall, these cases have 
the unintended effect of diminishing the importance of the legal tie of mar-
riage. 
Even jurisdictions that do not allow nonmarital relationships to lead to 
any property rights recognize them when they are paired with marriage. Mis-
                                                                                                                           
 78 In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764, 770–71 (Wash. 2000). 
 79 Id. at 771. 
 80 Id. There were actually two consolidated cases before the court, and it denied recovery in both. 
 81 Id. at 776. The court in Connell also contemplated the parties’ intent although it did not specify 
whether that intent was directed towards the kind of relationship the parties were in. In fact, the lan-
guage of intent came from Lindsey, where the court used it to describe how the parties treated the 
property in the relationship, not how the parties understood the relationship itself. See Connell, 898 
P.2d at 834 (citing Lindsey for support when discussing “the intent of the parties”); Lindsey, 678 P.2d 
at 331 (discussing intent in the context of how property was used during the relationship). 
 82 In this case, the court’s decision clearly insulates the man’s decision not to propose. Many of 
the cases have this overall effect. See infra notes 345–352 and accompanying text. 
 83 Such an approach is not inevitable. See infra notes 298–324 and accompanying text. From an 
anecdotal viewpoint, cases that consider the whole relationship are in the minority; the majority of 
courts appear to separate the nonmarital period from the marital period. See Tait, supra note 24, at 
1295 (noting that in the premarital context at least, “[b]ecause most legal rights and responsibilities in 
a romantic relationship begin at the moment of marriage, courts often do not assess premarital mo-
ments of commitment and partnership”). 
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sissippi, for instance, is one of the few holdouts that declines to provide prop-
erty rights to nonmarital couples.84 It does, however, allow for property distri-
bution in a nonmarital relationship that was marital at some point.85 In 2003, in 
Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, the Mississippi Court of Appeals reviewed an 
award of property for the caregiving services that Debra Wooldridge had pro-
vided to Steve Wooldridge after they divorced but continued to live together.86 
Steve argued that awarding Debra money for these domestic services was, in 
essence, awarding her “palimony,” in contravention of Mississippi’s refusal to 
award property to couples “without the benefit of marriage.”87 After consider-
ing the relevant precedents addressing nonmarital couples, the court noted that 
they were inapposite based on the simple fact that those couples had never 
been married. Here, the court explained, “Steve and Debra were more than 
‘pals’ by virtue of their previous marriage.”88 In fact, “but for want of obtain-
ing another marriage license, they lived in the same relationship in which they 
had lived from 1973 through 1994, holding themselves out to the public as 
well as their two daughters as having legally remarried.”89 
So reasoning, the Wooldridge court both privileged and trivialized the sta-
tus of marriage. It characterized the difference between marriage and nonmar-
riage as merely the difference between obtaining a license and failing to do so. 
The fact that this couple was once married, however, was significant enough to 
obviate the application of any cases that denied property distribution in the 
context of a nonmarital relationship. Having been married at some point al-
lowed the court to look past their divorce.90 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Wooldridge v. Wooldridge, 856 So. 2d 446, 457 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that equi-
table division of property between two cohabiting partners is not allowed). Mississippi may have 
arguably changed its approach to allow for claims of unjust enrichment even though the only decision 
stating as much was issued by the Mississippi Supreme Court in 2013 in the context of a same-sex 
couple and remains unpublished. See Cates v. Swain, No. 2010-CT-01939-SCT, 2013 WL 1831783, 
at *5 (Miss. June 27, 2013) (upholding a property distribution on the basis of unjust enrichment at the 
conclusion of a same-sex relationship). 
 85 Mississippi courts disagree on how to approach the relationship between marriage and nonmar-
riage. Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court disagrees with its lower courts about how to char-
acterize the effect of marriage on a nonmarital relationship. The Supreme Court is adamant about 
keeping marriage and nonmarriage distinct for purposes of property distribution upon divorce, yet the 
courts of appeal consider the relationship as one continuous whole. See infra notes 292–295 and ac-
companying text. Under either analysis, however, Mississippi recognizes property in the context of a 
nonmarital relationship where the couple was married at some point. 
 86 Wooldridge, 856 So. 2d at 448. 
 87 Id. at 449. 
 88 Id. at 453. 
 89 Id. (emphasis added). Important to the court was the fact that their whole relationship was one 
“of provider and domestic caretaker.” Id. 
 90 Id. But see Bunyard v. Bunyard, 828 So. 2d 775, 778 (Miss. 2002) (expressly disagreeing with 
the lower courts’ characterization of the effect of marriage); infra notes 279–282 and accompanying 
text. 
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Other cases characterize the nonmarital relationship as an inevitable pre-
cursor to an eventual marriage—this is, of course, easier to do when the rela-
tionship precedes the marriage, rather than follows the divorce. In 1989, in 
Malek v. Malek, the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals rejected an ex-
husband’s claim that distributing land acquired prior to the marriage would 
constitute an award of “palimony.”91 The court explained that it was well with-
in its discretion to consider the parties’ respective contributions “during both 
their premarital cohabitation and subsequent marriage.”92 The court’s reason 
was that the cohabitation did not take place on its own—instead, it was a situa-
tion where the “premarital cohabitation matured into marriage.”93 Accordingly, 
the “economic partnership” was understood to begin when the couple moved 
in together, sixteen months prior to their marriage.94 
Some cases go so far as to collapse the distinction between marriage and 
nonmarriage entirely. In 1986, in Nelson v. Nelson, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals had to assess whether a three-year period prior to the marriage should 
be included in the distribution of property at divorce.95 The court noted that 
“[t]he nature of the parties’ relationship prior to marriage was disputed at trial” 
in that the ex-husband admitted only to having sexual relations, while the ex-
wife argued they had been living together “as husband and wife.”96 The court 
agreed with the ex-wife, and treated the couple as having been married the en-
tire time they were together—“we think the record supports the finding that the 
parties were living together as husband and wife from 1976 until their mar-
riage in September 1979.”97 The premarital relationship was not only included 
for purposes of distributing property, but it became a marriage itself.98 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Malek v. Malek, 768 P.2d 243, 247 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989). Hawaii generally declines to dis-
tribute property between nonmarital couples. See, e.g., Maria v. Freitas, 832 P.2d 259, 261 (Haw. 
1992) (declining to provide plaintiff with property distribution at the conclusion of a nearly twenty-
year relationship given that the intent was not to share assets). 
 92 Malek, 768 P.2d at 246. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 245; see also Collins v. Wassell, 323 P.3d 1216, 1224 (Haw. 2014) (holding “premarital 
contributions are a relevant consideration where the parties cohabited and formed a premarital eco-
nomic partnership” in deciding property distributions during a divorce proceeding). 
 95 Nelson v. Nelson, 384 N.W.2d 468, 472–73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 96 Id. at 469. 
 97 Id. at 472 (emphasis added). The court did not consider the ex-husband’s argument as to 
whether it was awarding “palimony” in contravention to the anti-palimony statutes, given that the 
statutes had been enacted after the date of the parties’ marriage and were not retroactive. Id. 
 98 Minnesota does not recognize common-law marriage and has what it calls “anti-palimony” 
statutes that prevent “any claim by an individual to the earnings or property of another individual if 
the claim is based on the fact that the individuals lived together in contemplation of sexual relations 
and out of wedlock.” Obert v. Dahl, 574 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). Its courts interpret 
the statutes narrowly, however, and allow equitable and contractual claims between nonmarital cou-
ples. Id. at 749–50 (overturning grant of summary judgment because there was still a question of fact 
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Multiple marriages to the same person can also subsume a nonmarital re-
lationship that takes place in the interim. In 1985, in Skelton v. Skelton, the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered a claim for alimony after a three-
year-long marriage.99 The couple had, however, already been married nine 
years before and had lived together for six years in-between.100 In fashioning 
its property award, the court considered the entire period of time the parties 
had been together, merging the two marriages, the two divorces, and the period 
in the middle into a single relationship. The court affirmed the propriety of the 
award solely because there had been a “valid marriage.”101 
The court in Skelton also relied on the continuous role that the woman oc-
cupied. Because the court defined the purpose of alimony to “fill the needs of 
the future, not to compensate for the deeds of the past,”102 it considered not 
just the years the couple had been legally married, but the whole period of time 
that the woman had spent “in the role of spouse and homemaker.”103 The court 
in Wooldridge engaged in a similar analysis: important to its conclusion was 
the fact that the entire course of the relationship was defined as one “of pro-
vider and domestic caretaker.”104 Married or not, the woman’s role was con-
sistent—that of a homemaker, and thus of a wife. The appropriately marital-
like quality of the services led the courts to include a relationship that was not 
always a marriage in the property distribution at divorce. 
D. Termination of Alimony: Proof of Sex 
The final context in which courts have occasion to address a nonmarital 
relationship for purposes of property distribution is deciding whether to termi-
nate alimony payments. The issue courts face is whether an ex-spouse’s new, 
nonmarital relationship should end payments awarded on the basis of the prior 
marriage. In these cases, courts are surprisingly willing to rely on the mere 
                                                                                                                           
as to “whether the parties’ sexual relations were the sole consideration for any contract between them 
and whether [plaintiff] seeks to preserve her own property or acquire [defendant’s] earnings or proper-
ty”). 
 99 Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Me. 1985). 
 100 Id. at 1206. 
 101 Id. at 1209. There are cases where the marriage has less of a gravitational pull for the court, 
but it nonetheless considers contributions made during the premarital relationship. See In re Marriage 
of Clark, 71 P.3d 1228, 1231 (Mont. 2003) (including premarital property in calculating award be-
cause of contributions made by ex-wife to the land during the premarital cohabitation period). 
 102 Skelton, 490 A.2d at 1207. 
 103 Id. at 1208. These were important insofar as they affected her “opportunity for the develop-
ment of . . . marketable employment skills.” Id. 
 104 Wooldridge, 856 So. 2d at 453. 
22 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1 
presence of sex to end support; and, courts easily liken a nonmarital relation-
ship to marriage in the process.105 
Although the general rule used to be that remarriage terminated alimo-
ny,106 the rising rates of cohabitation, along with the desire to promote mar-
riage (including remarriage), led courts and legislatures to include cohabitation 
as a separate basis for ending alimony payments.107 Jurisdictions have formu-
lated a number of approaches to determine when cohabitation should terminate 
alimony. Erez Aloni has identified three: upon proof of cohabitation; upon 
proof of a change in the financial circumstances of the recipient ex-spouse; 
and, where the presumption that cohabitation caused a change in financial cir-
cumstances has not been rebutted.108 The different approaches reflect the dif-
ferent purposes alimony is understood to serve, including providing for future 
support, accounting for a wife’s needs post-divorce, or compensating any fi-
nancial loss stemming from the marriage.109 
Scholars have explored the asymmetry of terminating alimony on account 
of cohabitation without bestowing any attendant benefits onto that status,110 
and how controlling alimony results in controlling a woman’s sex life, as the 
ex-wife is typically the recipient spouse.111 There is, however, little scholarship 
deconstructing how courts define, and assess, the nonmarital relationship for 
the purpose of terminating support. That is the task of this section. 
The termination of alimony cases are further important because they 
make explicit how courts themselves are linking sex and support within and 
                                                                                                                           
 105 In nearly all of the cases that reach the court, the parties are an ex-wife who is receiving ali-
mony from her ex-husband and not the other way around. See Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and 
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (1989) (critiquing alimony in that it “still connotes the 
transfer to a financially needy and deserving wife of assets belonging to her ex-husband”). 
 106 Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Ser-
vices, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 25 (2003) (noting that remarriage, or death of the recipient spouse, 
would terminate alimony). 
 107 See Emily M. May, Note, Should Moving In Mean Losing Out? Making a Case to Clarify the 
Legal Effect of Cohabitation on Alimony, 62 DUKE L.J. 403, 405–06 (2012) (analyzing the case law 
addressing how cohabitation impacts alimony payments and arguing for an update in light of the prin-
ciples undergirding alimony and the social science research on the realities of cohabitation). 
 108 Aloni, supra note 14, at 1317–18. 
 109 May, supra note 107, at 412–17. The rationale for alimony originated in the duties owed by 
the husband to support his wife. Perry, supra note 106, at 23; see also JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 
201–06 (2011) (identifying the various, and inconsistent, theories for awarding alimony); Ira Mark 
Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 53 (1989) (arguing that there is no unifying 
theory of alimony and proposing one that would incentivize sharing behavior during marriage). 
 110 Aloni, supra note 14, at 1315–20. 
 111 Perry, supra note 106, at 27 (explaining “how deeply the doctrine of support and services is 
intertwined with gender hierarchy and male policing of women’s sexuality” and concluding that a 
woman who “appears not to be having sex with anyone receives better treatment under the law than a 
woman who appears to have found a new sexual partner”). 
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outside of marriage. They also provide a unique perspective on how courts 
draw the line between marriage and nonmarriage—courts that decide whether 
to terminate alimony on the basis of a nonmarital relationship articulate a con-
cern that their decisions may elevate nonmarriage to the status of marriage. 
1. Sex in Lieu of Support 
In deciding whether to terminate alimony on the basis of a nonmarital re-
lationship, courts rely on the presence of sexual relations, or the possibility of 
sexual relations,112 to the exclusion of any other consideration. That is, they 
consider proof of sex in lieu of proof of financial support in determining 
whether to terminate alimony on the basis of the nonmarital relationship.  By 
severing sex from support, these courts are in essence perfectly conflating the 
two: rather than distance sex from support, these decisions affirm the notion 
that sex and support are, and should be, exchanged. Courts’ singular reliance 
on sex also ends up eliminating any distinction between the de jure and the de 
facto family: proof of sex leads courts to conclude that a nonmarital relation-
ship approximates a marital one. 
The question before courts often is whether the new relationship is mar-
riage-like. Illinois, which denies nonmarital couples property distribution,113 
has nevertheless long acknowledged that a cohabiting relationship can lead to a 
termination of alimony if it is “conjugal” in nature.114 In 2006, the Appellate 
Court of Illinois explained in In re Marriage of James A. Susan that the statu-
tory requirement was intended to reach those cases where a party “becomes 
involved in a husband-and-wife relationship but does not legally formalize 
it.”115 Yet the court in Susan interpreted the statute to provide two distinct ba-
ses for terminating an award—where there has been a change in the financial 
circumstances of the ex-spouse, or where the ex-spouse begins a new relation-
ship.116 By cordoning off the question of whether the new relationship impacts 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ill. 1985) (holding that “a con-
jugal relationship does not require sexual conduct” insofar as “an impotent male is capable of a conju-
gal relationship”). Thus, Illinois has defined “conjugal” to not even require sex. Id. 
 113 See Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, 2016 WL 6235511, *13–16 (Ill. Aug. 18, 2016) (af-
firming the court’s 1979 decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt and overturning appellate court decision that had 
awarded property on the basis of a nonmarital relationship, reasoning that it is against public policy). 
 114 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/510(c) (2016) (terminating alimony if “the party receiving mainte-
nance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis”); see also Aloni, supra 
note 14, at 1318 (noting the different standards jurisdictions employ in determining what constitutes 
cohabitation for the purpose of terminating alimony). 
 115 In re Marriage of Susan, 856 N.E.2d 1167, 1170–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
 116 Its justification for understanding the two as separate requirements is the inequity that would 
otherwise result “when the recipient spouse becomes involved in a husband-wife relationship but does 
not formalize the relationship.” Id. at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the ex-wife’s financial needs, the only question that remains for the court is 
whether a nonmarital relationship is sufficiently like a marriage: “the goal is 
not to determine whether the relationship leaves the recipient financially se-
cure, but rather to determine whether the relationship leaves the recipient ef-
fectively married.”117 
Thus severing the requirements, the court in Susan went about consider-
ing whether there was a marriage-like relationship—by looking to whether the 
parties were having sex. The ex-spouse, Monica Susan, and her new boyfriend 
did not live together and had sex only occasionally.118 Yet the court found that 
intermittent sex and Monica’s routine sleepovers at her boyfriend’s place 
amounted to a “de facto marriage.”119 To bolster its conclusion, the court in 
Susan went deep into the details of the relationship—it considered who paid 
for the meals that each cooked and prepared, how they signed the Christmas 
cards they sent out every year, and which room they stayed in when they visit-
ed their respective children.120 It did not matter that the ex-wife and her new 
boyfriend did not commingle funds or provide each other with any monetary 
support.121 It only mattered that the contours looked roughly like marriage to 
the court, based in large part on the presence of sexual relations. 
Evidence of sex not only supplants any requirement of support, but it also 
supplies proof of cohabitation. In 2003, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in 
Honeycutt v. Honeycutt was asked to interpret a marriage dissolution contract 
that terminated alimony if a series of conditions occurred, including the wife’s 
remarriage, or “cohabitat[ion] with a man not related to her.”122 The trial court 
declined to terminate the alimony payments because the ex-wife had not re-
married, and there was no evidence that her new boyfriend provided her with 
any financial support.123 On appeal, the court overturned that decision. It rea-
soned that the plain language of the contract required cohabitation.124 In inter-
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. at 1172; see also In re Marriage of Schober, 379 N.W.2d 46, 48 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) 
(expressing a concern that “the current status of Iowa law on modification of alimony precipitates the 
decision to engage in a meretricious relationship by cohabiting, when marriage is the desire of the 
parties, so as not to jeopardize alimony payments”). 
 118 Susan, 856 N.E.2d at 1169 (noting that at the time of trial, they had not had sex in over two 
years). The court’s overarching intent to promote marriage by making nonmarriage an equally unat-
tractive alternative for purposes of alimony was successful. 
 119 Id. at 1171. 
 120 Id. at 1169. 
 121 Id. at 1172 (“Respondent’s argument essentially confuses two separate bases for terminating 
maintenance: termination due to substantial change in circumstances and termination due to de facto 
remarriage.”). 
 122 Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 152 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Alimony is terminated 
not only on the basis of a state’s statutes but also on the basis of agreements entered into by the par-
ties. Id. 
 123 Id. at 563. 
 124 Id. at 566. 
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preting the term, the court only required proof of sex. Because it found that the 
“[w]ife began an exclusive romantic relationship” which involved “engaging 
in sexual relations,” staying with her new partner when she visited him in Flor-
ida, and sharing his bed,125 the court terminated the payments. Sex, or the sug-
gestion of sex in Honeycutt provided evidence of the cohabitation itself—in 
concluding that the couple lived together, the court quoted from testimony that 
showed that the ex-wife “kept a large amount of clothes, including underwear” 
at her new boyfriend’s house.126  
In 2004, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Bennett v. Bennett, engaged in 
a similarly facile conflation of sex and cohabitation for purposes of terminating 
alimony.127 Kentucky’s alimony statute requires proof of a change in financial 
circumstances in order to terminate alimony payments.128 But, in interpreting 
the parties’ private marital settlement agreement, the court defined cohabitation 
so as to not require support or living together—the ex-wife’s “relation-
ship . . . qualifies as cohabitation whether considered in light of sexual in-
volvement or living in the same house.”129 Even if the parties were not living 
together, proof that they were having sex was sufficient to support a finding 
that they cohabited.130 The court’s willingness in Bennett to recognize the sex-
ual relationship between the ex-wife and her new boyfriend had the effect of 
eclipsing the marital relationship that existed between husband and wife—the 
court ignored the fact that the ex-wife’s boyfriend was still married and there-
fore maintained his own residence, bank accounts, and investments.131 
Sex provides courts with such a perfect proxy for support that the lack of 
sex can trump evidence of the presence of support. In 2015, a Florida appellate 
court interpreted a marital settlement agreement in Atkinson v. Atkinson, to not 
terminate alimony payments because the ex-wife’s new relationship was not 
sexual or romantic in nature.132 The ex-wife was living with another man who 
paid rent and arguably affected the ex-wife’s financial situation, but the record 
showed that the ex-wife and her new tenant “did not have an intimate relation-
                                                                                                                           
 125 Id. at 564–65. 
 126 Id. at 565 (quotation marks omitted). 
 127 Bennett v. Bennett, 133 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). 
 128 Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 261–62 (Ky. 1990). 
 129 Bennett, 133 S.W.3d at 490 (emphasis added). 
 130 Id. This is the mirror image of those cases that rely on cohabitation to presume an illicit rela-
tionship. See infra notes 167–230 and accompanying text. In both instances, sex and cohabitation are 
interchangeable. 
 131 Bennett, 133 S.W.3d at 489. 
 132 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 157 So. 3d 473, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). Florida terminates ali-
mony by statute where “a supportive relationship” exists “between the obligee and a person with 
whom the obligee resides.” FLA. STAT. § 61.14(b) (2010). The supportive relationship generally re-
quires proof that it “takes the financial place of a remarriage and necessarily decreases the need of the 
obligee.” French v. French, 4 So. 3d 5, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
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ship”; “the time that they spent together was limited”; “[t]hey did not generally 
take meals together”; and “[t]hey did not hold themselves out as husband and 
wife.”133 The court therefore declined to find that she was cohabiting accord-
ing to the terms of the agreement, and decided not to terminate her payments. 
These termination of alimony cases focus on the ex-wife’s relationship. 
As Bennett exemplifies, a man’s relationship, even if marital, is routinely ig-
nored by the law. This state of affairs is all but guaranteed by the general rule 
that alimony is only terminated by a relationship entered into by the recipient 
spouse and not the paying spouse.134 The effect of these decisions is to allow a 
man to have relationships with multiple women, while a woman suffers mate-
rial consequences for having relationships with more than one man. An ex-
husband’s new relationship does not end his responsibility towards his ex-
spouse: he can support multiple women at a time, even to his detriment. The 
law, however, is clear in stating that a woman can only be supported by one 
man at a time, whether she is married or not. Because these decisions rely on 
sex instead of support, they can also be read as preventing a woman from hav-
ing sexual relations with more than one man at a time.  
The bargain the law seeks to prevent is made explicit in the 1978 case of 
In re Marriage of Leib, decided by the California Court of Appeal just two 
years after Marvin.135 In Leib, the court grappled with how a nonmarital rela-
tionship affected the termination of alimony analysis. It turned to Marvin for 
guidance.136 The court relied on Marvin’s recognition of agreements between 
nonmarital partners to conclude that alimony should be terminated. The court 
reasoned that June Leib, the ex-wife, was providing her new boyfriend “the 
identical services a nonworking wife is expected to and generally does furnish 
to a working husband.”137 These services, the court concluded, were not free 
after Marvin: “On any market, the services of a homemaker, housekeeper, cook 
and companion” have a quantifiable value.138 June should therefore be making 
a bargain with her nonmarital partner, newly sanctioned by Marvin, for the 
value of her services. 
The court in Leib told the woman in no uncertain terms that she should 
negotiate for support with her current nonmarital partner: the law would no 
longer allow her to claim spousal support from her old one.139 The court was 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Atkinson, 157 So. 3d at 479–80. 
 134 See, e.g., Racsko v. Racsko, 924 A.2d 878, 880 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (dismissing petition to 
change alimony based on the cohabitation of the ex-husband who was paying alimony to the ex-wife). 
 135 In re Marriage of Leib, 145 Cal. Rptr. 763, 766 (Ct. App. 1978). 
 136 Id. at 769. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 770. 
 139 Id. at 771. 
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especially concerned with the notion of mismatched support—the ex-husband 
was paying a woman to be someone else’s wife, and receiving nothing in re-
turn. The court thus placed the duty on the new partner to provide the woman 
with compensation—for her “wifely” services—whether married or not.140  
Some courts frame this exchange in more disparaging terms—as one that 
a savvy ex-wife seeks to capitalize on. In 1982, in In re Marriage of Sasson, 
the California Court of Appeal declined to terminate payments on the basis of a 
nonmarital relationship.141 The concurring judge agreed but was preoccupied 
with preventing the ex-wife from securing support from more than one man.142 
The concurrence viewed the ex-wife as a shrewd player of the system—by 
saying no to remarriage, she was “savoring the best of two worlds, and captur-
ing the benefits of both.”143 As such, the concurrence articulated a concern 
bubbling just beneath the surface in these termination of alimony cases—that 
the ex-wife could both retain her alimony payments, “while setting the stage 
for a possible future ‘palimony’ suit against [her] present paramour.”144 
This vision of the conniving woman who preys on unassuming (yet 
wealthy) men is far from new.145 What has gone unnoted, however, is how 
courts themselves provide the foundation for these scheming women to act— 
by eliminating proof of support and replacing it with proof of sex in deciding 
whether to terminate alimony, courts are assuming that sex in the new relation-
ship leads, or ought to lead, to support. Yet the effect of the decisions is exactly 
the reverse: engaging in sex outside of marriage leads courts to terminate any 
actual support the woman was receiving. 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See Perry, supra note 106, at 27 (noting that alimony law “reflects an assumption that women 
essentially trade sexual services for financial support in their relationships with men,” leading to the 
retention of “some kind of a proprietary interest in his ex-wife’s body”). 
 141 In re Marriage of Sasson, 180 Cal. Rptr. 815, 819 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 142 Id. at 820–21 (Hanson, J., concurring). 
 143 Id. at 821. 
 144 Id. A Florida court articulated a similar concern: “The law of Florida creates no legal rights or 
duties between live-ins. Why, then, should a duty (support) created by a lawful marriage be terminated 
by such a relationship?” Lowry v. Lowry, 512 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). The wor-
ry was that its decision would provide a basis for palimony suits—“[t]he shoe which has not yet been 
dropped in Florida-palimony-may then have a reason to leap into being.” Id. 
 145 See Dubler, supra note 39, at 1002 (“In abolishing common law marriage, . . . New York em-
braced not only a new set of legal rules, but also a new vision of femininity. The law erred . . . in con-
structing women as the weak victims of men that the Victorians had supposed them to be. In fact, 
women, not men, comprised the deceitful and conniving sex. Women, powerful and crafty, preyed 
mercilessly on the weakness and vulnerability of unsuspecting men.”). This particular rhetoric was 
popular in the lead up to the abolition of common law marriage. 
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2. Nonmarriage as Marriage 
The concurrence’s fears in Sasson are based on an exaggerated view of 
the success rate of palimony suits; if the ex-wife wants to secure her property 
rights in the new relationship, she should remarry. The collapsing of sex and 
support that takes place in the alimony context is unique among nonmarital 
relationships. It also happens to occur when courts deny the ex-wife payment, 
rather than provide her with affirmative property rights. This easy substitution 
of sex for support, and of nonmarriage for marriage, leads courts to worry that 
their reasoning in the termination of alimony context may impact nonmarital 
relationships across the board. 
In 1999, the Iowa Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Ales found that 
nonmarriage could be akin to remarriage for purposes of determining whether 
a nonmarital relationship should terminate spousal support. 146 It ultimately 
declined to terminate support in that case, reasoning that the basis for the 
award was to further rehabilitation and reimbursement for services that had 
already taken place. The concurrence was still worried about the majority’s 
perceived conflation of marriage and nonmarriage.147 He predicted that blur-
ring the two statuses in the alimony context could lead to equating a couple 
who merely cohabits to a couple who is married, which was a problem given 
that “cohabitants are not afforded the same legal rights or responsibilities as 
married persons.”148 
This potential equivalence between the two statuses motivated the Ohio 
Court of Appeals in 2009, in Fitz v. Fitz, to ask whether allowing a nonmarital 
relationship to terminate alimony would violate the state’s Defense of Mar-
riage Act.149 The Ohio constitution prohibited providing any sort of legal status 
to “relationships of unmarried individuals.”150 Accordingly, the trial court re-
fused to find that a nonmarital relationship between an ex-wife and her new 
boyfriend terminated alimony because “the court would have to find cohabita-
tion tantamount to marriage.”151 The appeals court overturned the decision, by 
limiting the import of cohabitation. It held that it was only the fact of cohabita-
tion led to the termination or modification of alimony, rather than any associa-
tion it had to marriage.152 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698, 702–03 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). 
 147 Id. at 706 (Streit, J., specially concurring) (“There is no reason to blur the legal distinction 
between marriage and cohabitation as the majority does here.”). 
 148 Id. at 705. 
 149 Fitz v. Fitz, No. 92535, 2009 WL 3155124, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2009). 
 150 Id. (quotation marks omitted). It also declined to recognize same-sex unions. Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
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Courts’ concerns with accidentally elevating cohabitation to the status of 
marriage has led some to prevent even long-term and stable nonmarital rela-
tionships from terminating alimony.153 In Sasson, the ex-husband sought to end 
his alimony obligations based on a dissolution contract that terminated such 
payments upon “remarriage.” His ex-wife had not married again, but she had 
moved in with a new partner, had a child with him, took his last name, and 
shared a joint bank account.154 The court declined to view this relationship as 
one of remarriage under the terms of the contract, given the lack of a formal 
legal status. In doing so, it relied on the state legislature’s “pains to avoid 
equating cohabitation of any degree with remarriage.”155 
Despite the concerns articulated by courts, they rarely impose higher 
standards on a nonmarital relationship based on how it is treated outside of the 
alimony context. Nevada, which allows cohabiting couples to access the state’s 
divorce laws by analogy,156 is an exception. It relies on the cases addressing 
nonmarital couples in general to inform its approach in deciding alimony in 
particular. In 1998, the Nevada Supreme Court in Gilman v. Gilman refused to 
allow the ex-wives’ nonmarital relationships in the consolidated cases before it 
to terminate their alimony payments.157 It reached this conclusion by relying 
on the decisions addressing property distribution at the end of a nonmarital 
relationship.158 The court’s comparison between the different contexts led it to 
conclude that the bar was set too low in deciding to end alimony. The court 
held that the mere presence of “cohabitation” plus “a romantic relationship” 
was insufficient to terminate payments.159 In a move rarely made, the court 
required more of the nonmarital relationship to terminate alimony, given how it 
was treated elsewhere.160 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See In re Sasson, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
 154 Id. at 820. 
 155 Id. at 819. It also noted the specific disabilities imposed by lack of marriage—by choosing not 
to marry, the ex-wife “has deprived herself of the beneficient protection which the state bestows upon 
a wife.” Id. 
 156 Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 765–77 (Nev. 1998); see supra notes 83–104 and accompa-
nying text (discussing where courts define nonmarital relationships by looking to whether the couple 
had previously been married). 
 157 Gilman, 956 P.2d at 765–77. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id. at 767 (“There is no evidence of pooling of assets or holding themselves out as husband 
and wife or treating their assets as community property or building a business together.”). The Chief 
Justice was, however, concerned with the fear already vocalized of savoring the best of both worlds, 
“creat[ing] a form of financial polygamy, thus providing a powerful disincentive for lawful marriage.” 
Id. at 770, n.4 (Springer, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 160 When courts require more of a nonmarital relationship, it is generally to approximate the bar 
set by marriage (as in the palimony context, or where jurisdictions, including Nevada, apply divorce 
rules “by analogy”), and not to determine what nonmarriage itself should look like. See supra notes 
41–82 and accompanying text. 
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Courts are clearly attuned to the overlap among the different types of 
nonmarital couplings and are able to identify the differing definitions they im-
pose depending on the claims at issue. Courts’ willingness to find that a non-
marital relationship is marital-like in deciding whether to terminate alimony 
takes place where their decisions terminate actual payments of support (in the 
form of alimony) to the ex-wife. All of the cases thus have, at a very basic lev-
el, the same effect—they function to deny or diminish the woman’s claim to 
property, as the non-wife, or the ex-wife. The decision to not marry in the 
strictly nonmarital context, or to not remarry in the alimony context, leads 
courts more often than not to deny the woman any rights to property. 
II. NONMARRIAGE IS NOT MARRIAGE 
This Part turns to those cases that do not require the relationship to look 
like a marriage in assessing property claims outside of marriage. Although 
marriage no longer provides the substance that courts rely on in analyzing 
nonmarital relationships, or the doctrines that courts apply, marriage continues 
to be central to the project of defining nonmarriage—by opposition instead of 
analogy. 
This Part focuses on those cases that distinguish marriage from nonmar-
riage. Similar to those that liken nonmarriage to marriage, they span situations 
where the couple has never married and where the couple was married at some 
point. In a complete departure from the cases discussed in Part I, however, 
courts here tend to value only services that look nothing like those rendered in 
the course of a marriage. Accordingly, being in a marital-like relationship leads 
courts to deny property distribution to the party seeking it, which continues to 
be the woman. Despite their differences, both sets of cases ultimately have a 
similar effect—they demarcate marriage as the sole site where spousal-like 
services lead to support, in the process actively defining what those spousal-
like services should be. 
The standard concern voiced by courts that deny spousal-like services 
remuneration outside of marriage is the age-old anxiety over what essentially 
amounts to prostitution—an exchange of sex for property.161 This exchange 
becomes problematic, however, only outside the terrain of marriage. This Part 
catalogues the reasoning the cases employ in addressing a nonmarital relation-
ship without relying exclusively on marriage. Cases either construct the non-
marital relationship as a place of altruism, where sex and services are provided 
for free or at a discount, or they allow an exchange as long as courts can sepa-
rate the relationship from anything approaching marriage. This Part concludes 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Hasday, supra note 19, at 507–08 (noting how courts decline to validate contracts between 
nonmarital couples where sex is the consideration). 
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by identifying the small number of cases that are able to quantify an exchange 
between individuals in a sexual relationship outside of marriage, and the even 
fewer number that provide an egalitarian distribution of assets at the conclu-
sion of the relationship. 
A. Language of Love: Economic Exchange Not Recognized 
The dynamic between love and economic exchange is one that Reva 
Siegel has explored in great historical detail in the context of marriage.162 In 
considering how courts interpreted the marital property acts passed at the turn 
of the twentieth century, she found that they imposed a “regime of judicially 
enforced ‘altruism,’” in the sphere of family relations, in stark opposition to 
the marketplace where “self-interest and the hope of material gain” were the 
norm.163 A similar dynamic continues to take shape today. Yet courts have 
moved the “language of love”164 to the spaces outside of marriage; and, it is 
sometimes so strong that it encroaches onto the “separate sphere” of the mar-
ketplace, rendering any work done outside of the home invisible by virtue of 
its association with a nonmarital relationship.  
Beginning from the baseline that nonmarriage is not marriage, the cases 
addressing claims brought by individuals at the conclusion of their relationship 
vary in their approach. Courts generally undertake one of two corollary modes 
of reasoning: they either treat the individuals in a nonmarital relationship pure-
ly as lovers—as such their relation is defined by affection and altruism—or 
they value the exchange if they ignore the sexual and affective nature of the 
relationship altogether. Some courts—very few—go beyond the presence or 
absence of love, and consider the exchanges that took place without ignoring 
the sexual aspect of the relationship. They do so by addressing the accumula-
tion of property by one individual, or the intent of the parties in the relation-
ship.165 
Overall, this section shows that in most cases, the plaintiff fares better in a 
nonmarital relationship where both individuals contribute financially than in a 
relationship where the individuals follow a breadwinner-homemaker model. 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See Siegel, supra note 32, at 2127–28 (exploring how the abolition of coverture did not signal 
the end of a gendered body of status law). 
 163 Id. at 2131. The result was that “title to family assets would remain with the husband” and 
women “found themselves economically disempowered in marriage and impoverished at divorce.” Id. 
 164 Id. at 2211. 
 165 Although some of these considerations sound more in contract, and others in equity, they do 
not precisely map onto these doctrinal divisions and actually cut across different claims. For a discus-
sion of the standard doctrine-based modes that courts undertake in addressing claims made by cohabit-
ing couples, see Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of Le-
gal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1276–83 (2015) (categorizing courts’ approaches in addressing prop-
erty division at the end of a cohabiting relationship). 
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Although this conclusion may come as no surprise when understood in the 
context of arguments that the law considers homemaking services, typically 
performed by women, to be gratuitous, it nevertheless challenges the notion 
that nonmarital relationships must mimic traditional marriage in all circum-
stances in order to gain recognition for purposes of property distribution.166 
Instead, the contrary is generally true in these cases—those relationships that 
the court describes as most like a traditional marriage are the most penalized 
for not being marital, insofar as the court declines to distribute any property 
when they end. The only consistent exception to this claim is where the court 
considers the parties’ intent—in these cases, the court is more willing to recog-
nize a quantifiable exchange, regardless of the particular form the relationship 
may take. 
1. Lovers Are Not Spouses 
In evaluating whether to distribute tangible property at the conclusion of a 
nonmarital relationship, cases employ twin lines of reasoning. The first charac-
terizes the nonmarital relationship as one based on love and emotion, to the 
exclusion of any economic relations. A separate, but related strand, ignores the 
romantic element of the relationship entirely—the court places the couple in 
the category of just friends, or of more distant acquaintances, refusing to 
acknowledge any sexual or romantic element whatsoever. Each approach leads 
to a different property distribution: acknowledging sex outside of marriage 
turns the relationship into a lovers’ quarrel without any expectation of econom-
ic exchange; only its absence allows the court to value the bargain that took 
place during the course of the relationship. Thus, where the court discusses 
terms of endearment, the plaintiff generally does not recover any property; 
where the court discusses terms of an exchange, the plaintiff generally does.167 
Both lines of reasoning work in tandem to support the same result: an ex-
change of money where sex is involved can only take place squarely within 
marriage.168 The cases that emphasize love in a relationship outside of mar-
riage devalue contributions made to the relationship that are not explicitly fi-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See supra notes 39–160 and accompanying text; see also Dubler, supra note 39, at 1019–21 
(identifying the complicated relationship between “acting married” and being married and noting that, 
at times, a “performance-based standard rewards couples who structure their relationships around 
historically contingent understandings of what it means to act married” and “penalizes nontraditional 
couples by upholding the idea that there is a single, normative model of legally cognizable relations”). 
The reasoning in these cases is the mirror image of those that require the nonmarital relationship to 
model marriage as a prerequisite to distributing property. 
 167 Cf. Siegel, supra note 32, at 2205 (noting that in the marital context “the discourse of marital 
status has evolved so that family relations originally expressed in the language of property can now be 
expressed in the language of affect”). 
 168 This tends to hold true whether the basis for the claim is contract or equity. 
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nancial. The plaintiffs who succeed then are those who make monetary contri-
butions to the relationship, rather than contributions in terms of time, or ser-
vices. The effect is to disfavor the partner who stays at home—generally the 
woman—and favor the partner who engages in paid work—generally the man. 
In 2009, the New York Supreme Court in Tompkins v. Jackson, began its 
decision denying recovery to the plaintiff in a nonmarital relationship, by de-
scribing the facts before it as an “unfortunate tale of a love relationship gone 
sour.”169 The court dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment, de-
finitively declaring an end to “this saga.”170 The plaintiff, Shaniqua Tompkins, 
pled a variety of theories of recovery including breach of contract, quantum 
meruit, and unjust enrichment.171 Shaniqua and her partner, Curtis Jackson 
(commonly known by his stage name 50 Cent), had one son together and a 
relationship that spanned over twelve years.172 At the basis of most of Sha-
niqua’s claims was the refrain that she and Curtis had an agreed-upon ex-
change whereby she offered homemaking and domestic services while he de-
voted his time to becoming a recording artist, which would eventually lead to 
earnings from his success that they would share.173 
The court, however, considered the “homemaking and cleaning services” 
Shaniqua performed to be “of a nature which would ordinarily be exchanged 
without expectation of pay.”174 Declining to recognize any property rights 
flowing from the relationship, the court noted that “[p]roviding loving care and 
assistance to her boyfriend and the father of their son . . . does not transform 
her relationship to [] one founded upon contract.”175 In deciding whether there 
was any breach of contract, the court excerpted Shaniqua’s testimony in which 
she explained that she loved Curtis: “I was going to be with him whether he 
was 50 Cent, with a hundred million dollars, or Curtis Jackson, working for 
sanitation.”176 The court found that such statements that “demonstrate loving 
devotion and loyalty” are precisely the ones that “undermine” both Shaniqua’s 
breach of contract and quantum meruit claims.177 In fact, deciding to recognize 
                                                                                                                           
 169 Tompkins v. Jackson, No. 104745/2008, 2009 WL 513858, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Feb. 3, 
2009). 
 170 Id. 
 171 The breach of contract claim was based on an alleged oral agreement to “take care of plaintiff 
for the rest of her life in exchange for her promise to perform household services and take care of the 
parties’ children.” Id. at *13–14. 
 172 Id. at *1–4. 
 173 Id. at *12. 
 174 Id. at *14. 
 175 Id. at *13. 
 176 Id. at *12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 177 Id. 
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payment for such care would, according to the court, “transform the parties’ 
personal, yet informal relationship to that of a marriage.”178 
New York law generally presumes that marriage is the only place where 
an exchange between sex and domestic services can occur, outside of an ex-
press contract. New York allows for unmarried couples “to contract with each 
other in relation to personal services, including domestic or ‘housewifely’ ser-
vices,”179 as long as the contract is express, rather than implied.180 The re-
quirement depends on a specific understanding of the nature of a nonmarital 
relationship: namely, that “the relationship of the parties makes it natural that 
the services were rendered gratuitously.”181  
The nature of the nonmarital relationship is also what counsels courts 
against implying a contract between the unmarried individuals. The New York 
Court of Appeals in 1980 in Morone v. Morone, explained that it was the emo-
tional character of these relationships that rendered it difficult to assess when 
services were provided gratuitously or required compensation.182 In fact, feel-
ings run so strong that the court presumed they would impact the quality of the 
testimony given—without the benefit of an express contract, the Morone court 
opined that there was a “substantially greater risk of emotion-laden after-
thought, not to mention fraud.”183 
Having a written agreement, however, is not always a shield to love’s 
tempestuous sword. In 2012, the Ohio Supreme Court in Williams v. Ormsby, 
relied on affection and love in denying the claimant recovery and criticized the 
dissent for doing the opposite: for having a “cynical view of the relationship 
between the parties” which was more appropriate for “a business transac-
tion.”184 At the crux of the case was a written agreement between the couple—
it stated that Amber Williams would move back into the home she shared with 
Fredrick Ormsby if he transferred back to her an undivided half interest in the 
property (which had previously been hers).185 The question the court set out to 
answer was “whether the emotional aspect of resuming a relationship by mov-
ing in together can serve as consideration for a contract.”186 The court found 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Id. at *13. 
 179 Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (N.Y. 1980). 
 180 Id. at 1155 (distinguishing itself from the California law set forth in Marvin, which recognizes 
implied contracts). 
 181 Id. at 1157. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Williams v. Ormsby, 966 N.E.2d 255, 258 (Ohio 2012) (Williams II). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. This was distinct both from the question framed by the dissent, and from the holding of the 
appellate court, which found that Amber had established “consideration in that she shared her assets 
. . . and resumed living together as a couple.” Williams v. Ormsby, 944 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2010) (Williams I), rev’d, 966 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 2012). 
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that it could not, thus overturning the appellate court’s decision to the contrary, 
and concluded that nothing else of value was exchanged.187 
Justice Pfeifer, writing in dissent, criticized the majority for its misguided 
focus, “chas[ing] a red herring (‘love and affection’) all the way upstream until 
it reached a dry creek bed.”188 He turned to the express agreement at the center 
of the case and concluded that there was valid consideration, provided by the 
repudiation of the initial agreement the parties had entered into.189 Justice 
Pfeifer explained that Fredrick wrote the second agreement, by which he 
gained certain benefits not present in the prior contract. Trading the language 
of spurned lovers for one of contract, the dissent carved out a space where the 
individuals in a nonmarital relationship could engage in negotiations.190 
Nonetheless, courts uniformly agree that sex cannot be the basis for any 
type of enforceable agreement between nonmarital couples.191 Indeed, Sha-
niqua was careful to note that she did not expect any remuneration for sex—
“‘when you love a person . . . it’s not about the monetary. If you’re a prostitute, 
then it’s a monetary thing. We were two people in love with each other.’”192 
The court concurred and relied on love to deny her remuneration for any ser-
vices at all. 
Courts routinely expand the prohibition on remunerating sex to include 
remunerating any services that take place in a relationship outside of marriage. 
The specific services courts decline to recognize however, are only those that 
are expected to take place in a marriage. Even outside of a contractual claim, 
only “[m]oney, labor, and material—separate and distinct from spouse-like 
services—are valid consideration.”193 In 1989, in Evans v. Wall, the defendant, 
Douglas Evans, ejected the plaintiff, Kathie Wall, from the premises they had 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Williams II, 966 N.E.2d at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 188 Id. at 266 (Pfeifer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 189 Id. 
 190 The dissent does not completely ignore the relationship’s romantic characteristics—it simply 
does not end its analysis based on that fact. An in-depth discussion of the case for a survey of Ohio 
law characterized the majority’s decision as “blatant about its concern for nearing the slippery slope of 
palimony.” Hannah de’Von Armentrout, Williams v. Ormsby, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 957, 971 (2013). 
The survey further argued that the dissent got the better of the argument, as it “relied heavily upon the 
express provisions” of the contract, “did not delve into the complications of ‘love and affection,’ and 
steered clear of the slippery palimony slope the majority feared.” Id. at 971–72. 
 191 E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P. 2d 106, 112 (Cal. 1976) (“a contract between nonmarital part-
ners is unenforceable only [t]o the extent that it [e]xplicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit consid-
eration of meretricious sexual services”); Hasday, supra note 19, at 507–08 (“In reviewing any con-
tract between unmarried sexual partners, a court will first sever any aspect of the contract based on the 
exchange of sexual services for economic compensation.”). 
 192 Tompkins, 2009 WL 513858, at *12. 
 193 See Evans v. Wall, 542 So. 2d 1055, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding a constructive 
trust imposed in favor of female plaintiff at the end of a nonmarital relationship). 
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occupied together for five years.194 Both Kathie and Douglas were employed. 
The Florida District Court of Appeals noted that Kathie had used her income to 
pay for food, household furnishings, and the like.195 She also worked on the 
land that Douglas had paid for, helping to upkeep the mango grove and assist-
ing with the construction of a new concrete dwelling and barn.196 In addition, 
she was responsible for the cooking, cleaning, and washing.197 In the five years 
they lived together, the land appreciated in the amount of $75,000.198 The court 
acknowledged Kathie’s right to remuneration on the basis of a constructive 
trust for her efforts. In doing so, the court assessed her contribution only in 
terms of labor, money, and materials.199 Kathie was ultimately awarded 
$8,000—about 11% of the land’s increase in value.200 
The dissent in Evans characterized its disagreement with the majority as 
being over the value of love. It concluded that awarding Kathie even 11%of 
the value of the property appreciation was too generous, and declined to quan-
tify Kathie’s efforts given that the relationship was “one of mutual conven-
ience [that] was grounded upon a love relationship, which, unfortunately, 
turned sour.”201 Further dissenting from the denial of en banc review, Judge 
Jorgenson used similar love-sick language—establishing a new cause of action 
was “inappropriate” where the basis was “the fallout of unmarried, cohabiting 
lovers.”202 Ultimately, however, portraying the separation as a “lovers’ quarrel” 
was insufficient to invalidate the financial exchange that took place, based on 
the majority’s understanding that it existed entirely outside the realm of spous-
al-like relations.203 
                                                                                                                           
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. (“This case is about reimbursing a woman-ejected from her former lover’s home-the rea-
sonable value of capital, materials, and labor invested over a five-year period, in his residen-
tial/commercial property. It is not at all about palimony . . . as the dissent suggests.”). 
 200 Id.; see also Porter v. Zuromski, 6 A.3d 372, 376 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (imposing a con-
structive trust to prevent the unjust enrichment of defendant for the value of rent and property-related 
expenses); McKechnie v. Berg, 667 N.W.2d 628, 630 (N.D. 2003) (considering only the parties’ fi-
nancial expenditures, such as their use of a joint bank account and their pooled earnings, and that they 
both contributed roughly equal amounts in acquiring assets). 
 201 Evans, 542 So. 2d at 1058 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 1057 (majority opinion); see also Stevens v. Muse, 562 So. 2d 852, 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1990) (overturning trial court’s decision that any agreement between an unmarried couple was 
unenforceable because it would violate public policy and holding that cosigning a note, pledging a 
certificate of deposit, and promising to repay a loan could be valid given that it was made separate and 
apart from any sexual relations). 
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Jurisdictions that refuse to award any property rights in the context of a 
nonmarital relationship are even more explicit in upholding the separation be-
tween lovers and spouses. Peering beneath their wholesale rejection reveals 
that courts in these jurisdictions still distribute property among individuals 
who are in a relationship without the stamp of marriage, as long as they can 
keep marriage entirely distinct. The Louisiana Court of Appeal’s 1983 decision 
in Schwegmann v. Schwegmann epitomizes these concerns.204 The court held 
that “unmarried cohabitation does not give rise to property rights analogous to 
or similar to those of married couples.”205 The specific distinction Louisiana 
set up was between a “concubine” and a “wife”: a concubine is “a woman who 
occupies the position, performs the duties, and assumes the responsibilities of a 
wife, without the title and privileges flowing from a legal marriage.”206 That is, 
the central difference between a concubine and a wife lies in the latter’s legal 
title.207 
The court in Schwegmann declined to recognize property rights based on 
either contractual or equitable theories stemming from a twelve-year nonmari-
tal relationship between John G. Schwegmann, Jr., “a twice divorced, middle 
age male who owned a chain of supermarkets and other assets” and Mary Ann 
Blackledge, “a 24 year old unmarried female who had no property or other 
financial assets.”208 The court’s reasoning revolved entirely around the fact that 
the individuals “were never married and neither of them ever believed they 
were married to each other.”209 Accordingly, the domestic services Mary Ann 
had performed, including cooking, caring for John’s daughter, chauffeuring, 
cleaning, and nursing John after a stroke, were not entitled to compensation.210 
These were, according to the court, “inextricably interwoven with the sexual 
relationship.”211 
The sole issue that survived the court’s dismissal in Schwegmann was 
whether Mary Ann had performed “real and substantial business services . . . 
that ha[d] not been previously compensated and which were separate and dis-
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 205 Id. at 324. 
 206 Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Purvis v. Purvis, 162 So. 239, 240 (La. 
Ct. App. 1935)). 
 207 The definition of a “paramour” is dependent on the status of the woman—a paramour is de-
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 208 Id. at 320. 
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 210 Id. at 324. 
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tinct from the concubinage relationship.”212 Sex is only a problem for the court 
with relation to services that take place in a context similar to the give-and-
take of marriage. The parties in Schwegmann were “living together as man and 
wife”—he provided her “with full subsistence and a home” in exchange for her 
duties as a “mistress.”213 Because she was not in fact a wife, however, the court 
refused to consider property distribution for services that a wife would or 
should render. But even courts in jurisdictions like Louisiana are open to enter-
taining requests for property where the claims are based on services that courts 
consider not to be a part of the marital relationship. 
Georgia also declines to recognize property rights in the context of an 
unmarried couple, based on the standard concern that it would otherwise be 
condoning illicit sexual relations.214 Courts, however, deny property rights 
without considering whether the illicit relation actually played a role in the 
property exchange. In 1977, in Rehak v. Mathis, the Georgia Supreme Court 
refused to consider Hazel Rehak’s claims that she should receive property after 
her partner, Archie Mathis, told her to vacate the home in which they lived.215 
Hazel and Archie had shared installment payments on the home throughout 
most of their eighteen-year relationship; Hazel further alleged that she had 
cooked, cleaned, and cared for Archie during the time they lived together.216 
The court’s opinion was brief. It relied on the “well settled” principle “that nei-
ther a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to a 
contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration.”217 The court, 
however, defined “immoral consideration” as “[t]he parties being unmarried 
and . . . having admitted the fact of cohabitation.”218 The “illicit sexual rela-
tions” were nowhere to be found.219  
                                                                                                                           
 212 Id. at 325. In this way it was, at least in theory, more solicitous of a potential property distribu-
tion than those courts that relied on the language of love in negating any possibility of recovery, even 
for services rendered to a business. 
 213 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the reasoning of Guerin v. Bonaventure, 212 
So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 1968), as applicable to the case before it). 
 214 See Wellmaker v. Roberts, 101 S.E.2d 712, 713 (Ga. 1958) (declining to provide a remedy for 
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 215 Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977). 
 216 Id. at 81 (noting that appellant alleged that appellee neither paid her for her purchase interest 
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 218 Id. at 82 (majority opinion). 
 219 As the dissent pointed out, Archie had not shown that “sex was any part of the consideration 
of this alleged contract.” Id. at 83 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
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Instead, the court based its denial of property on the fact that the couple 
was unmarried and living together. Like in the palimony context, where cohab-
itation was important as a means of allowing the court to value the domestic, 
rather than the sexual, services that flowed from it,220 cohabitation here is 
problematic because of those same reasons. That is, cohabitation functions not 
necessarily as a proxy for sex but rather as a proxy for marriage. It results in a 
denial of property for the very reason it ensures that the woman seeking pali-
mony will receive support—because courts assume that cohabitation leads to 
cooking, cleaning, and caring, services that approach those that are, or should 
be, provided in a marriage. Sex, or illicit consideration, becomes a problem 
only in a relationship that looks too much like a marriage. 
Georgia can therefore distribute property when it ignores the relation-
ship’s sexual, affective, or marital-like component altogether. In 2000, in Burt 
v. Skrzyniarz, the Georgia Supreme Court awarded property at the conclusion 
of a nonmarital relationship.221 It did so without any discussion of the nature of 
the relationship, relying solely on the doctrine of tenancy in common. The 
couple, Paul Burt and Nancy Skrzyniarz, took possession of a home seven 
years into their nonmarital relationship.222 When they split, Nancy claimed a 
half interest in the property; Paul, on the other hand, argued that he owned a 
ninety-nine percent interest.223 The court, relying on testimony of the former 
couple’s real estate agent and a few witnesses, held that the evidence was in-
sufficient to rebut the presumption of a tenancy in common by which each 
owned fifty percent of the property at issue.224 
The claim in Burt involved a property-based doctrine as opposed to a con-
tractual or equitable doctrine, which may explain the court’s different ap-
proach. Nevertheless, the court’s reliance on tenancy in common proves the 
point that where it avoids any discussion of the parties’ sexual or romantic re-
lationship—which both parties explicitly raised in their briefs225—it can dis-
tribute property in a nonmarital relationship. By restricting its analysis to ten-
ancy in common, the court avoided a discussion of immoral consideration, or 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See supra notes 41–68 and accompanying text (addressing situations where courts used cohab-
itation as a marker for property distribution). 
 221 Burt v. Skrzyniarz, 526 S.E.2d 848, 850–51 (Ga. 2000). 
 222 Id. at 849. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 850. 
 225 The briefs submitted to the court clearly set out the sexual nature of their relationship: “The un-
disputed evidence at trial established that Mr. Burt and Ms. Skrzyniarz were involved in a sexual rela-
tionship for approximately seven years. . . . During their entire relationship, Ms. Skrzyniarz was married 
to a man other than Mr. Burt.” Brief of Appellant, at 2, Burt, 526 S.E.2d 848 (No. S99A1824), 1999 WL 
33737977, at *2. Nancy’s brief specified: “Even though both were married at the time, they were es-
tranged from their spouses.” Brief of Appellee, at 2, Burt, 526 S.E.2d 848 (No. S99A1824), 1999 WL 
33737980, at *2. 
40 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1 
of Paul and Nancy’s cohabitation, in deciding whether and how to divide the 
property. It was also silent as to who had original title over the property. The 
court thereby distributed property in a context it had explicitly declined to do 
so.226 
Applying a doctrine that addresses only the property at issue, or focuses 
on the purely financial contributions to the nonmarital relationship, raises few 
problems for courts given that they can neatly cordon off the sexual relation-
ship from the award of property. Raising a child or cleaning a house, however, 
are also activities that exist separate from sex and are similarly quantifiable.227 
Yet valuing homemaking services causes courts to worry about inadvertently 
sanctioning prostitution. The court in Schwegmann affirmed the link between 
the two, explaining “the domestic services of child care, nursing, cooking, etc., 
were inextricably interwoven with sexual services in a concubinage relation-
ship.”228 The court’s reasoning was based on the critical fact that the exchange 
in that case was for Mary Ann “to be a wife.”229 This is precisely how sex and 
domestic services are “interwoven”: both are duties a wife owes to her hus-
band. Accordingly, these cases dictate that a woman can receive compensation 
for such services only if they take place within a marriage, not outside of it. 
These cases demarcate marriage as the site where this exchange is sanc-
tioned by law. In the process, they unmistakably identify the duties of the wife: 
                                                                                                                           
 226 Georgia is understood as a jurisdiction that denies cohabitants any type of remedy. See 
Strauss, supra note 165, at 1276 (describing Georgia as a jurisdiction that denies cohabitants legal 
remedies, including “written relationship contracts”). Illinois, another jurisdiction that has declined to 
recognize property rights between unmarried couples since 1979 in Hewitt v. Hewitt, follows similar 
reasoning. 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979). In 1983, the Illinois Court of Appeals, in Spafford v. 
Coats, reasoned:  
The plaintiff’s claims in Hewitt for one-half of defendant’s property were based primar-
ily upon her services as housekeeper and homemaker and obviously fell afoul of the 
court’s concerns. However, where the claims do not arise from the relationship between 
the parties and are not rights closely resembling those arising from conventional mar-
riages, we conclude that the public policy expressed in Hewitt does not bar judicial 
recognition of such claims. 
455 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (emphasis added) (imposing a constructive trust over vehi-
cles that were jointly accumulated during a nonmarital relationship but held only in defendant’s 
name). 
 227 See What to Look for in a Nanny, WHAT TO EXPECT, http://www.whattoexpect.com/first-
year/childcare-options/what-to-look-for-in-a-nanny.aspx [https://perma.cc/9A5B-NFQX] (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2016) (identifying qualities to look for in a “good” nanny and not listing willingness to have 
sex as one of those qualities); House Cleaner Job Description, AMERICA’S JOB EXCHANGE, 
http://www.americasjobexchange.com/house-cleaner-job-description [https://perma.cc/W758-EDHQ] 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2016) (not listing sexual services as part of job description). A potential employ-
er generally hires a nanny, or a house cleaner, for pay and without the expectation that they will also 
have sex with the employer. 
 228 Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 324. 
 229 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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she must provide sex, along with homemaking services. The jurisdictions that 
approach the nonmarital relationship through the lens of marriage identify 
these very same wifely duties230—the difference is that they allow for, rather 
than prevent, a distribution of property.231 
2. Lovers Are Not Business Partners 
Courts’ reluctance to compensate domestic services in the context of a 
nonmarital relationship can be so strong as to extend beyond the boundaries of 
the relationship itself, and into the realm of employed work. Contributions 
made outside of the home in a literal sense are sometimes absorbed into its 
loving, affective and, ultimately gratuitous, pull. 
In 1997, in Featherston v. Steinhoff,232 the Michigan Court of Appeals de-
clined to provide the plaintiff with any recovery for a breach of contract claim. 
Karen Featherston and Lee Steinhoff had lived together for eight years and had 
one son.233 In Michigan, “services rendered during a meretricious relationship 
are presumably gratuitous.”234 The court thus held that Karen’s “performance 
of household services” did not overcome the presumption that they were freely 
given.235 During the course of their relationship, however, Karen had assumed 
more than household services—she also took a job working with Lee. As such, 
the lower court found that there had been a contract implied in fact: it reasoned 
that when Karen met Lee, she provided consideration by quitting school and 
her job, thus foregoing those opportunities to provide not only housework and 
childcare services, but also to assist with Lee’s business.236 On appeal, the 
court rejected these findings. Not only did the presumptively gratuitous 
housework remain gratuitous, but even those services she provided to Lee’s 
business—without pay—did not merit remuneration.237 
Courts sometimes acknowledge the contributions made to a business in the 
context of a nonmarital relationship; but their value is assessed—specifically, 
decreased—given that they take place outside of marriage. In 2007, in Gazvo-
da v. Wright, the Indiana Court of Appeals addressed a sixteen-year relation-
                                                                                                                           
 230 They further assert what is excluded from these wifely duties, as for instance, mere companion-
ship. See Bergen v. Wood, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 77–78 (Ct. App. 1993) (stating housekeeping services are 
marital services but companionship services are not); supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text. 
 231 There is an exception found in the termination of alimony cases, which deny the ex-wife prop-
erty but still identify similar duties. See supra notes 116–173 and accompanying text. 
 232 Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
 233 Id. at 8. 
 234 Id. at 9. 
 235 Id. at 10. The irony of this determination is that when they began the relationship, Karen was 
self-employed as a house-cleaner. Id. at 9. 
 236 Id. at 10. 
 237 Id. 
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ship during which the couple started a business together.238 Bruce Gazvoda 
met Sabrina Wright when she was still in high school. She dropped out of 
school shortly after Bruce asked her to help him learn about the electric busi-
ness with the hopes of setting up a company of their own. As the court noted: 
“Bruce and Sabrina worked together every day, sometimes for up to twelve 
hours.”239 Over the course of four years, they built their business. Sabrina 
“wired boxes and stuffed plugs”; “trained electrical helpers, handled the com-
pany’s billing and payroll, and oversaw job sites when Bruce was not available 
to do so.”240 She was also responsible for maintaining their home, including 
cooking and cleaning.241 The court noted that the relationship went “beyond 
the traditional family arrangement of one person maintaining a household . . . 
in exchange for the other person providing home and living expenses.”242 Dur-
ing this time, Sabrina did not receive compensation. 
Over the course of their relationship, marriage was discussed. Bruce, 
however, “told Sabrina that the businesses and assets belonged to both of them 
and that marriage was just a piece of paper.”243 It turned out to be a valuable 
piece of paper for Sabrina. The court found that Sabrina worked both in the 
business and the home. In fact, “[t]he parties’ joint efforts, their lifestyle, and 
Bruce’s representations that the assets and businesses were ‘ours’ created an 
expectation that both parties had access to the assets while they remained to-
gether.”244 The court concluded, however, that Bruce “contributed more to the 
businesses” than Sabrina had.245 Significantly, it reasoned that “[t]he presump-
tion of an equal division of assets that would apply in a dissolution of marriage 
does not apply here.”246 Accordingly, the court affirmed the award to Sabrina 
on the basis of unjust enrichment, which it calculated to be less than a quarter 
of the assets acquired during their relationship.247 
                                                                                                                           
 238 Gazvoda v. Wright, No. 07A01-0607-CV-288, 2007 WL 2284722, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 
10, 2007). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. at *2. 
 243 Id. at *1. 
 244 Id. at *2. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. 
 247 The court awarded Sabrina $250,000 on a theory of unjust enrichment. The value of the assets 
acquired during the course of the relationship was estimated at over one million dollars. Id. at *3 (not-
ing that cohabitants who have not married could also bring claims based on express or implied con-
tract). The question of what amount would constitute an appropriate, or a fair, award remains. This 
Article does not address that question directly—instead, it focuses on identifying the reasoning em-
ployed in reaching the decision of whether to distribute property in the first instance, linking that rea-
soning with differing amounts, and critiquing the effects of such reasoning. 
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The plaintiffs in Featherston and Gazvoda—both women—worked at 
home and at the businesses they helped run. Yet, in both cases, the court either 
did not value, or decreased the value of, the contributions made in the home 
and to the business. In the process, these courts identify marriage as the only 
site where business services can presumably be equitably remunerated: it pays 
to be a wife not only at home, but also at work. 
B. Beyond Love or Money: Economic Exchange Recognized 
There are indeed cases where courts assess the exchanges present within a 
relationship head-on without relying exclusively on appeals to love or money. 
Gazvoda provides an example of a case where the court entertained the possi-
bility of an economic exchange within a nonmarital relationship. It did so 
without ignoring the “spousal-like” quality of the services or the sexual nature 
of the relationship. Courts in these circumstances quantify homemaking ser-
vices even where the relationship was not marital.248 
Most of the cases that provide compensation to the plaintiff, like Gazvo-
da, are based on claims of unjust enrichment; this equitable doctrine requires 
courts to conclude that “one party has received money or benefit at [the] ex-
pense of another, and that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the 
other party to retain what is sought to be recovered.”249 For some courts, how-
ever, the intent of the individuals in the relationship is paramount in ensuring 
equity. 
The two different approaches—unjust enrichment and intent—result in 
different property distributions. Courts that rely on a straightforward applica-
tion of the unjust enrichment doctrine award the plaintiff some property but 
generally much less than half of the assets accumulated during the relationship. 
Courts that consider the intent of the parties provide the plaintiff with half of 
the property at issue, including cases where the parties’ relationship followed a 
traditional, breadwinner-homemaker structure. 
1. Unjust Enrichment: Less Than Half 
The court in Gazvoda quantified Sabrina’s efforts under the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment, but denied her an equal division of assets at the conclusion 
of the relationship.250 Courts that apply the doctrine of unjust enrichment do 
not always rely on the language of love to negate an economic exchange; but 
                                                                                                                           
 248 This valuation takes place at the moment of separation. Courts often explain that whatever 
value those services may have had, they were compensated during the course of the relationship itself. 
 249 42 C.J.S. Implied Contract § 9 (2016). 
 250 Gazvoda, 2007 WL 2284722, at *1; see also supra notes 193–202 and accompanying text 
(noting that courts refuse to recognize anything but money, labor, and material as valid consideration). 
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they generally decline to award the complainant anywhere near half of the 
property at issue. 
In 2003, in Turner v. Freed, the Indiana Court of Appeals applied the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment in acknowledging that homemaking services had 
economic value—only, they did not have half of the value of the property ac-
quired over the course of the ten-year nonmarital relationship.251 The court 
acknowledged that during her relationship with Danny Turner, Angela Freed 
“took care of their child . . . regularly maintained the home and contributed 
financially by performing one of [defendant]’s daily newspaper delivery 
routes.”252 The court concluded that Danny would be “unjustly enriched if 
[Angela] were awarded no part of the value of the assets [Danny] acquired in 
his name alone during their cohabitation.”253 This meant that she was entitled 
to $18,000, when the total value of the assets accumulated during the relation-
ship was calculated at $108,000.254 
In the more protracted 1987 litigation of Watts v. Watts, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion—homemaking services are worth 
something, just not half of the value of the property acquired during the course 
of the relationship.255 Sue Ann Evans Watts and James Watts lived together for 
twelve years and had two children together.256 The court adopted Sue Ann’s 
version of events in deciding the motion to dismiss, which explained that she 
was in essence “living . . . in a ‘marriage-like relationship.’”257 During this 
time, Sue Ann contributed both to the home and to James’s business. In addi-
tion to furnishing her own personal property, she did the “cleaning, cooking, 
laundering, shopping, errands, and maintain[ed] the grounds surrounding the 
parties’ home.”258 She also worked as a receptionist, typist and bookkeeper for 
                                                                                                                           
 251 Turner v. Freed, 792 N.E.2d 947, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (taking into account that defendant 
“received substantial benefit from [plaintiff’s] homemaking and housekeeping responsibilities” in 
providing an award based on unjust enrichment). 
 252 Id. at 950. 
 253 Id. at 951. 
 254 Id. at 949. 
 255 Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Wis. 1987) (Watts I) (considering an appeal from the 
grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Watts v. Watts, 448 N.W.2d 292 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1989) (Watts II) (considering appeal after remand). Given the clearly articulated bases for an 
award, Watts I is a favorite of textbook authors, included in both contracts and property textbooks. 
See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACTS LAW 295–304 (7th ed. 2012); JO-
SEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW 712–16 (6th ed. 2014). 
 256 Watts I, 405 N.W.2d at 305. 
 257 In determining that the relationship was marriage-like, the court noted that Sue Ann assumed 
the defendant’s surname as her own; their two children also took his surname; they filed joint tax 
returns and maintained joint bank accounts; they purchased real and personal property as husband and 
wife, and so on. Id. at 306. 
 258 Id. 
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around twenty to twenty-five hours a week at James’s office, for which she 
received no compensation.259 
The court declined to apply Wisconsin’s laws of divorce,260 but it recog-
nized that unmarried partners may request a property distribution based on a 
variety of claims including express or implied contract, unjust enrichment, or 
partition. Moreover, it held that homemaking services could either be accepta-
ble consideration for a contract, or provide the basis for an unjust enrichment 
claim. The court relied on the latter theory, reasoning that Sue Ann had ade-
quately alleged that her services provided James with a benefit.261 On remand, 
the jury awarded Sue Ann $113,090.08. This amounted to about 13% of the 
property acquired throughout the relationship according to James’s expert and 
10% according to Sue Ann’s expert.262 
The court affirmed the jury award even though it admitted that it did not 
have a clear sense of how the particular amount was reached. It noted only that 
there was evidence that the services Sue Ann performed to maintain their home 
and help James’s business, “fertilized the increased value of Watts’ property, 
not only by helping him in the business but also by freeing him from many 
nonbusiness tasks.”263 The court further relied on the percentage of property 
James had left Sue Ann in a will he had executed during their relationship, 
even though intent, as a doctrinal matter, is irrelevant to the question of unjust 
enrichment.264 Sue Ann was thereby awarded substantially less than half of the 
property accrued during their twelve-year relationship.265 
                                                                                                                           
 259 Id. at 306–07. 
 260 The court interpreted the statute to only address and promote the marital family. Id. at 308–09. 
 261 Id. at 314, 316. 
 262 Watts II, 448 N.W.2d at 294, 294 n.1. The trial court below did not find that any implied in 
fact contract had been breached. There was some doctrinal confusion as to what the jury concluded on 
the implied in fact claim, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately found that the terms of the 
implied contract were to provide support only as long as the relationship lasted, and that interpreted in 
this fashion the jury had found that the contract was not in fact breached. Id. at 295–96. 
 263 Id. at 296–97. 
 264 42 C.J.S. Implied Contract § 9. As such, the intent of James—not the intent of Sue Ann—
came in through the back door in the unjust enrichment analysis. He had left her 10% of his property, 
excluding business-related property. Watts II, 448 N.W.2d at 297. 
 265 Watts II, 448 N.W.2d at 297. The amount she was paid came out to approximately $12,000 a 
year for both her business and home-related activities. Id. In 1987, the poverty threshold for a four-
person family was about $11,000. National Longitudinal Study of Youth, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/codebook-supplement/nlsy79-
appendix-2-total-net-family-3 [https://perma.cc/4WDF-6SPA] (last visited Nov. 24, 2016). Since 
Watts II, Wisconsin has retreated from quantifying homemaking services of their own accord. Waage 
v. Borer, 525 N.W.2d 96, 98–99 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained 
that “Watts does not recognize recompense for housekeeping or other services unless the services are 
linked to an accumulation of wealth or assets during the relationship.” Id. at 98. As such, it overturned 
the jury’s award in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $25,000. Id. at 97–98. 
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The absence of marriage does not completely preclude courts in these 
cases from recognizing a quantifiable exchange during the relationship. In de-
ciding claims of unjust enrichment, however, courts appraise services provided 
during the relationship as distinctly less valuable than financial contributions, 
which take the form of title over property or money.266 Although no longer 
gratuitous, the services provided in the home and at work, but outside of mar-
riage, are offered at a discount.267 
2. Turning to Intent: Equal Distribution 
Where courts focus on the intent of the parties to the relationship, in in-
terpreting an agreement or imposing equity, the result is a more egalitarian di-
vision of assets. In the process, they end up turning the relationship between 
the affective and the economic on its head. 
In 2006, in Dutton v. Laine, the Kansas Court of Appeals considered the 
parties’ intent in dividing the property acquired by Cara Dutton and Edward 
Laine during the time that they lived together.268 Cara had downloaded an 
agreement titled “Prenuptial/Cohabitation Agreement” from the Internet, 
which the couple signed before moving in together.269 The agreement specified 
that the separate property owned by each would remain separate throughout 
the relationship and any future dissolution.270 The court upheld the agreement 
but found that it was silent as to what to do with any joint property acquired 
during the relationship.271 Accordingly, the court found that the parties had 
entered into an agreement beyond the written one. The consideration for that 
agreement, the court held, was the mutual love and affection each had for the 
other.272 That is, the language of love that typically raises the presumption of 
                                                                                                                           
 266 This is not to say that courts are misapplying the doctrine of unjust enrichment—it may be the 
correct application of the doctrine itself that values the housework at such rates. 
 267 Divorce is different, despite its various shortcomings. In a community property state, divorce 
generally leads to an equal distribution, as does equitable distribution in separate property states, 
though many criticize the latter for continuing to miss the mark. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways 
to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1236–37 (in arguing that a partner-
ship theory of marriage undergirds the law of divorce, the article identifies the similarities between the 
two property regimes at divorce and notes “courts must take into account nonfinancial contributions to 
the accumulation of marital property” and “even unequal but equitable divisions of property embrace 
a concept of marriage as a partnership similar to that employed in the community property states”). 
 268 Dutton v. Laine, No. 93,934, 2006 WL 851389, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006). 
 269 Id. at *1. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. at *4 (“[T]he agreement says nothing about how jointly owned property would be divided 
upon separation or how it would be determined whether property was jointly owned or separately 
owned. . . . There is simply no language covering the issue.”). 
 272 Id. 
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gratuity became the very basis for the exchange that led to a property distribu-
tion.273 
In reaching its conclusion, the Kansas court looked beyond who had con-
tributed financially to acquiring the property and instead relied on the parties’ 
intent. Even though Edward had bought most of the furniture that the couple 
used, the court considered the property to be joint property because “[i]t is 
clear they intended to use the items together in their new house, and the items 
were jointly acquired for that purpose, notwithstanding the source of pay-
ment.”274 Given that “both [parties] contributed to household expenses” and 
they “lived in a residence together as a family,” Cara was awarded half of all of 
the items.275 
The intent of the parties to the relationship was also paramount for the 
Oregon Court of Appeals in the 1993 case of Wilbur v. DeLapp, which consid-
ered an especially pronounced disparity in the financial contributions made to 
the relationship.276 Wilma Wilbur and Noel DeLapp had lived together for six-
teen years without marrying.277 The court acknowledged that it was entitled to 
“distribute property owned by the parties in a non-marital domestic relation-
ship.”278 Even if the property was all held in Noel’s name, the primary deter-
mination in the equitable proceeding was whether there was “an intent to share 
equally.”279 
The court’s focus on the parties’ intent to share allowed it to value each 
party’s contribution to the relationship, even where the contribution took a 
non-financial form. The court noted that Wilma “assumed the role of home-
maker”; when possible, she would use her money to improve the home, or chip 
in for their living expenses.280 The court concluded that all of these contribu-
tions had economic value. Because the financial arrangement and division of 
responsibilities was accepted by both parties, the court found that “it was the 
intent of the parties that plaintiff have an interest in the house” and it awarded 
Wilma a one-half interest “as a matter of equity.”281 The court also relied on 
Wilma’s role as homemaker in awarding her half of Noel’s retirement ac-
count—“[h]er contribution to the relationship” was “assist[ing] defendant in 
his career and allow[ing] for a more comfortable standard of living.”282 For 
                                                                                                                           
 273 See supra notes 39–160 and accompanying text. 
 274 Dutton, 2006 WL 851389, at *4–5. 
 275 Id. at *4 (affirming the lower court’s order). 
 276 Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1152 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). 
 277 Id. At the time of their separation, Wilma was sixty-three years old and Noel was forty-six. Id. 
 278 Id. at 1153. 
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this, she merited remuneration.283 As such, the court recognized Wilma’s con-
tributions to the relationship, including household services, on equal terms as 
Noel’s financial ones.284 
The lodestar in the cases that compensate homemaking services during a 
nonmarital relationship is the parties’ intent. The result is a much more egali-
tarian division of property—where generally half is awarded to the plaintiff—
even when only one party brings in the money, or has title over the property. 
C. Marriage and Nonmarriage: Separate and Distinct 
Courts do not always subsume periods of nonmarriage into marriage in 
the course of a relationship that experienced both:285 some cases compart-
mentalize each period into separate and distinct statuses. This latter set of cases 
defines the world in terms of people who are married, and those who are not, 
regardless of the fact that the couple before the court was both married and 
unmarried at some point. Such a partitioning of the relationship does not lead 
to a consistent outcome in terms of property distribution: some courts award 
property on the basis of the nonmarital relationship; others, especially those 
that provide unmarried couples with rights upon separation, refuse to include 
the nonmarital period in the property distribution at divorce. Although one may 
expect those jurisdictions that allow a nonmarital relationship to lead to a 
property division to also include that relationship at the conclusion of a mar-
riage, this is not the case.286 Moreover, some jurisdictions that expressly refuse 
to divide property among unmarried individuals include the nonmarital rela-
tionship in assessing property rights at divorce. 
                                                                                                                           
 283 The court found that “[g]iven her primary role as homemaker, she had a limited opportunity to 
accrue a retirement fund of her own.” Id. Combined with her modest financial contributions to house-
hold expenses, the court decided they were also enough to award Wilma interest in Noel’s retirement 
funds. Id. 
 284 The court in Marvin also considered the intent of the parties in establishing whether there was 
an implied contract or another claim based in equity. See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 117, n.11 (“[T]he mere 
fact that a couple have not participated in a valid marriage ceremony cannot serve as a basis for a 
court’s inference that the couple intend to keep their earnings and property separate and independent; 
the parties’ intention can only be ascertained by a more searching inquiry into the nature of their rela-
tionship.”). Accordingly, Marvin declined to consider domestic services rendered throughout the 
course of the relationship as gratuitous—“[t]here is no more reason to presume that services are con-
tributed as a gift than to presume that funds are contributed as a gift.” Id. at 121. 
 285 For a discussion of those cases that treat this period as one continuous marital relationship, see 
supra notes 83–104 and accompanying text. 
 286 New Jersey, for instance, does not include premarital cohabitation into the property distribu-
tion at divorce, even though it allows for both property division and palimony in the context of non-
marital relationships. Supra notes 248–284 and accompanying text. 
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In 2006, in Loughlin v. Loughlin, a case with a very similar fact pattern to 
Skelton in that the couple had also been twice married and twice divorced,287 
the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized only the last period of marriage.288 
In deciding whether to award alimony at the end of the couple’s second di-
vorce, the court kept the marriage entirely separate from the nonmarital rela-
tionship. The result was that the court addressed only the six-year period of the 
second marriage rather than the collective twenty-two years the couple had 
been together.289 
Although the Loughlin court had the task of interpreting the statutory 
term “length of a marriage” for purposes of alimony and property distribution, 
it revealed a very specific understanding of marriage—as completely distinct 
from any other status, even if the same two individuals had been both married 
and unmarried.290 The court explained that when the parties divorced, “they 
reassumed the legal status of two single people, regardless of their inten-
tions.”291 
The Mississippi Supreme Court espouses a similar split in statuses.292 De-
spite enforcing a separation between marriage and nonmarriage, however, the 
court does not unequivocally exclude the nonmarital period in determining an 
appropriate property distribution. In 2002, in Bunyard v. Bunyard, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to include the period 
of cohabitation in distributing property at divorce. It did fault the appellate 
court for its reasoning though—the lower court had relied on a theory of mar-
riage and nonmarriage as one continuous whole in concluding that the mar-
riage had ratified the prior relationship.293 Rather than rely on the retrograde 
influence of marriage, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the decidedly 
                                                                                                                           
 287 See Loughlin v. Loughlin, 910 A.2d 963, 967 (Conn. 2006); see also supra notes 99–103 and 
accompanying text (discussing Skelton v. Skelton, where the Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed 
an alimony claim after a marriage of three years). 
 288 Loughlin, 910 A.2d at 972–74. 
 289 Id. at 974 (admitting that “the difference between the length of their entire relationship, ap-
proximately twenty-two years, and the length of their second marriage, six years, is not insubstan-
tial”). 
 290 Id. at 970. Massachusetts recently came to the opposite conclusion in interpreting the statutory 
term “length of the marriage,” holding “the length of the marriage includes the period during which 
the parties were cohabiting before they remarried, and the period of the parties’ first marriage.” Duff-
Kareores v. Kareores, 52 N.E.3d 115, 117 (Mass. 2016). 
 291 Loughlin, 910 A.2d at 972 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 292 The Mississippi Supreme Court is actually in conflict with the reasoning its appellate courts 
employ. See infra notes 293–295 and accompanying text. 
 293 Bunyard v. Bunyard, 828 So. 2d 775, 778 (Miss. 2002) (holding that land acquired by husband 
prior to marriage was joint property given wife’s contributions to the land). As such, Wooldridge v. 
Wooldridge, discussed in notes 285–309 and accompanying text, arguably failed to comply with the 
Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Bunyard. 
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premarital property had been improved by the joint efforts of the couple.294 In 
particular, although the husband had purchased the land, the wife had 
“work[ed] on the land . . . putting up the fence, gardening, feeding the cows, 
and building the pier for the catfish pond.”295 
Jurisdictions that recognize a nonmarital relationship on its own terms 
sometimes refuse to consider it when paired with marriage, based on the 
strength of their acknowledgment. California and New Jersey, both of which 
attach relatively strong property rights to a nonmarital relationship, keep mar-
riage and nonmarriage distinct when they take place in the course of a single 
relationship. They also generally refrain from including the nonmarital period 
in the distribution of property at divorce. In In re Marriage of Bukaty, in 1986, 
the California Court of Appeal advised the wife seeking a property distribution 
at divorce to plead a separate cause of action for any claim based on the non-
marital period of the relationship.296 The husband and wife had been married 
for twelve years, after which they divorced. They resumed living together for 
twenty-seven years before getting married again. Their second marriage lasted 
just one year and seven months.297 In determining how to allocate the property 
at the time of the second divorce, the court affirmed the trial court’s considera-
tion of only the last marriage. The court declined to address the nearly thirty 
years the couple lived together after the initial marriage, divvying up the rela-
tionship into the portion that was marital and the portion that was not: “Any 
right to support attributable to the period of the parties’ cohabitation would be 
a Marvin right and could be asserted only in a separate civil action, not in a 
proceeding under the Family Law Act.”298  
New Jersey erects a similar wall between nonmarriage and marriage. In 
1987, in Rolle v. Rolle,299 the New Jersey Superior Court declined to include a 
premarital period in distributing property at divorce. Instead, “where the co-
habitation is, in fact, followed by a marriage,”300 the court held that the cases 
addressing nonmarital relationships tout court should apply.301 Relying on the 
plain terms of the New Jersey divorce statute that addressed property division 
                                                                                                                           
 294 Id. at 777. 
 295 Id. at 776. The couple also “ate the fish they caught and the vegetables” grown in the garden. 
Id. 
 296 In re Marriage of Bukaty, 225 Cal. Rptr. 492, 495–96 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 297 Id. at 494. 
 298 Id. at 495–96. In doing so, it relied on the importance of protecting and privileging the marital 
status. Id. at 496 (“The efforts of the Legislature to protect marital status were clearly written and have 
been held to apply only to a legal marriage. For us to do otherwise would be to disregard totally legis-
lative intent to grant certain rights and privileges to persons who sought and obtained that special 
status.” (citation omitted)). 
299 Rolle v. Rolle, 530 A.2d 847, 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.1987). 
 300 Id. 
 301 Id. 
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“during marriage,” the court concluded that “[p]roperty acquired during a peri-
od of cohabitation prior to the marriage cannot be equitably distributed” at di-
vorce.302 As in California, the plaintiff was advised to bring a wholly separate 
claim given that New Jersey has a distinct body of law dealing with the rights 
of nonmarital couples.303 
The stark demarcation between statuses can sometimes lead the marital 
period itself to be ignored. In 1994, in Wallender v. Wallender, the Oregon 
Court of Appeals addressed a couple who had been married for fifteen years, 
and then lived together for another nine after their divorce was finalized.304 
The court explained that “[t]he parties’ personal relationship was not affected 
significantly by the divorce.”305 The plaintiff, Sharon Wallender, continued be 
the primary caretaker and help with the family farm, while the defendant, 
Fredrick Wallender, remained the “primary provider of financial resources for 
the family.”306 Yet, in deciding how to distribute the property accrued at the 
end of their relationship, the court treated them as though they had never been 
married at all, applying precedent that dealt only with nonmarital relationships. 
Because Oregon courts rely on the parties’ intent in distributing property,307 it 
identified the prior marriage only to rely on the subsequent divorce, which the 
court interpreted as a clear signal of what the parties intended during their 
nonmarital relationship. Unlike a case that involved only nonmarital cohabita-
tion, “here, plaintiff knew that defendant did not intend to share his ownership 
of the farm after the dissolution.”308 The decision to have married at some 
point rendered the plaintiff worse off than if she had never married at all.309 
                                                                                                                           
 302 Id. 
 303 See id. Some New Jersey courts have used the term “merger” to describe the legal relationship 
between nonmarriage and marriage. Said “merger,” however, functions as a blanket replacement—any 
prior agreement that existed during the nonmarital relationship is “subsumed and merged into the 
contract created by the marriage vows.” Mangone v. Mangone, 495 A.2d 469, 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1985) (holding that because “plaintiff’s cause of action rests on the marriage contract, it must 
follow that plaintiff’s prayer for damages for breach of the live-together contract fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted”). Courts essentially decline to recognize any property rights stem-
ming from the nonmarital relationship because they are worried about the woman double-dipping into 
property that is not hers. Id. (“To allow plaintiff’s claims to succeed would duplicate the relief . . . to 
which she is entitled . . . in the dissolution action.”). 
 304 Wallender v. Wallender, 870 P.2d 232, 233 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Oregon is home to Wilbur, one of the few cases that awarded plaintiff half of the relevant 
property in distributing it at the conclusion of a nonmarital relationship, on the basis of the parties’ 
intent. 850 P.2d at 1153. Wallender distinguished Wilbur, not on the basis of having been married, but 
rather on the basis of intent—in Wilbur, the court found that the parties intended to share ownership. 
Wallender, 870 P.2d at 234–35; Wilbur, 850 P.2d at 1153. 
 308 Wallender, 870 P.2d at 234. 
 309 See id. at 235. Ignoring the marital portion of a relationship can sometimes result in a distribu-
tion of property for the plaintiff. See Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) 
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III. NONMARRIAGE AS A SITE TO PROMOTE MARRIAGE 
The cases that address nonmarital couples all assume, and many explicitly 
state, that the ultimate goal of their nonmarital jurisprudence is to promote 
marriage. Accordingly, their disagreement lies not over whether to promote 
marriage—an undisputed aim and rhetorical flourish they all employ—but ra-
ther over which outcome better satisfies this goal.310  
This Part focuses on two opposite ends of the spectrum in order to high-
light the central differences in courts’ reasoning. It first analyzes the cases in 
jurisdictions that deny nonmarital couples any property rights upon separation. 
It then considers the cases that equate the nonmarital relationship to marriage 
either “by analogy” or in deciding to award palimony.311 These two sets of cas-
es exhibit a similar preoccupation with marriage, albeit with different empha-
ses and results. The cases that do not recognize property rights reason that re-
fusing to do so promotes marriage; those that recognize property rights by re-
lying on the substance and form of marriage reason that doing so promotes 
marriage. In the process, both fail to consider how the rules regulating exit 
from a relationship impact the initial decision of which kind of relationship to 
enter—be it marital or not. 
 But, determining whether to award or deny property at the end of a rela-
tionship impacts more than the decision of whether to marry—it also tells a 
specific story about which individual in the relationship should seek out the 
status. The cases that decline to award property are focused on ensuring that 
the woman says yes when asked; the cases that decide to award property are 
focused on the man’s incentives to propose—by making it equally costly for 
him if he does not.  
A. Denying Property Rights Promotes Marriage 
The states that do not recognize rights between unmarried couples are 
Louisiana,312 Mississippi,313 Georgia,314 and Illinois.315 All do so based on an 
                                                                                                                           
(treating a relationship as purely nonmarital even though couple had been married for eleven years 
prior to their divorce and resumption of cohabitation and deciding to distribute some of the property to 
prevent the unjust enrichment of one of the parties). These scenarios generally arise, of course, where 
the nonmarital relationship follows the initial marriage. 
 310 The indeterminacy of appealing to the importance of marriage is perhaps most evident when 
courts invoke it in the course of discussing a nonmarital relationship that involved marriage at some 
point—these cases expose the futility of relying on marriage promotion when the parties have already 
opted to marry at least once. 
 311 These cases are discussed in sections A and B in Part I. 
 312 Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (“Under present Loui-
siana law, unmarried cohabitation does not give rise to property rights analogous to or similar to those 
of married couples. Concubines have no implied contract or equitable liens that afford them any rights 
in the property of their paramours.”). 
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expressed motivation to preserve the legal status of marriage. In protecting the 
institution of marriage, these cases end up placing the responsibility squarely 
onto the woman to say yes when asked. 
Mississippi is unambiguous in setting the responsibility on the woman to 
marry. In 1994, in Davis v. Davis, the Mississippi Supreme Court declined to 
divide any property between a couple that had lived together for thirteen 
years.316 It was particularly preoccupied with the fact that Elvis Davis had re-
jected Travis Davis’s marriage proposal—noting that the Mississippi legisla-
ture has declined to “extend[] the rights enjoyed by married individuals to 
those who merely cohabit,” it chided Elvis for having turned down Travis’s 
request to marry.317 To receive compensation for the labor she performed, the 
court made clear that “[w]hen opportunity knocks, one must answer its 
call”;318 in other words, Elvis should have married. Because Elvis “failed to do 
so,” the court concluded “her claim is all for naught.”319  
The Mississippi Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in 1995 in 
Malone v. Odom, relying on Davis for support.320 Patt Odom and Sidney 
Malone had an eighteen-year “on-again, off-again relationship”321 after which 
Patt filed an action for equitable division of their home. Like the couple in Da-
vis, “Patt had the opportunity to marry Sidney.”322 Yet she “chose not to.”323 
The Mississippi Supreme Court therefore declined to award Patt the $55,000 
the appellate court had ordered as compensation for the time, money, and effort 
Patt had invested into the property.324 The court’s message was clear: to re-
ceive compensation, Patt should have said yes. 
Even where the court is less explicit about stating that the woman should 
marry, the effect of the cases is to penalize her decision to say no. In 
Schwegmann, the Louisiana Court of Appeal asserted the importance of the 
                                                                                                                           
 313 Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931, 936 (Miss. 1994) (“Our legislature has not extended the rights 
enjoyed by married people to those who choose merely to cohabit. To the contrary, cohabitation is 
still prohibited by statute.”). 
 314 Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977) (“It is well settled that neither a court of law 
nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral 
consideration.”). 
 315 Blumenthal v. Brewer, No. 118781, 2016 WL 6235511, at *15, *18 (Ill. Aug. 18, 2016) (af-
firming Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979), holding that it “bars such relief if the claim is 
not independent from the parties’ living in a marriage-like relationship”). 
 316 Davis, 643 So. 2d at 936. 
 317 Id. at 935–36. 
 318 Id. at 936. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Malone v. Odom, 657 So. 2d 1112, 1117 (Miss. 1995). 
 321 Id. at 1114. 
 322 Id. at 1117. 
 323 Id. 
 324 Id. at 1115–16. 
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family to a “civilized society.”325 The court defined the family as one bound 
only by legal ties—as such, that “family” excluded nonmarital couples. To 
hold otherwise, the court stated, “is to do violence to the very structure of our 
civilized society. Without the family, the State cannot exist and without mar-
riage the family cannot exist.”326 Such reasoning, however, places the cost of 
upholding the “civilized” families of society almost entirely on the woman 
who has not married: it is she, the “concubine,”327 who typically goes to court, 
seeking property that she believes is rightfully hers, and which courts refuse to 
even hear.328 The court’s decision to abstain from distributing property at the 
conclusion of the relationship denies the plaintiff—which in nearly every case 
is a woman—a forum to request the property she wishes to obtain.329  
Thus, if it is the woman who says no, the law is likely to make her deci-
sion financially unsound.330 The corollary effect is: if the man declines to ask, 
then the law is generally supportive of his decision, insofar as it imposes no 
costs on his choice not to propose. 
B. Awarding Property Rights Promotes Marriage 
Courts that apply divorce laws “by analogy” and courts that provide for 
awards of palimony, are as preoccupied with promoting the institution of mar-
riage as those cases that refuse to recognize any exchange. These courts, how-
ever, understand the incentives to play out differently. In particular, a woman’s 
decision to marry—or not—is less relevant to a court’s analysis. Instead, these 
courts are concerned with ensuring that foregoing marriage is not financially 
beneficial for the individual with more assets. This means that they are more 
concerned with the man’s decision-making process. 
 Nevada and Washington remain wholly committed to the institution of 
marriage in applying the laws of divorce by analogy. In Michoff, the Nevada 
Supreme Court “reaffirm[ed] [the] state’s strong public policy interest in en-
couraging legally consummated marriages.”331 Likewise, marriage is the cor-
nerstone of the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Connell, which de-
fines the nonmarital relationship by relying entirely on marriage—a “meretri-
                                                                                                                           
 325 Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d at 323–24. 
 326 Id. at 326. 
 327 Id. at 324 (“Concubines have no implied contract or equitable liens that afford them any rights 
in the property of their paramours.”). 
 328 In nearly all cases the woman is bringing the claim seeking a property distribution to court. 
 329 The incentives are typically placed on the woman to either seek out marriage, or say yes when 
propositioned. See supra notes 316–328; infra notes 343–352 and accompanying text. 
 330 Courts literally make her decision not to marry costly by not providing her with any property 
at the conclusion of the relationship. 
 331 W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Nev. 1992). 
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cious relationship” that merits application of divorce rules “is a stable, marital-
like relationship.”332 These courts also distribute property at the conclusion of 
a nonmarital relationship in furtherance of their stated desire to promote mar-
riage. The problem they articulate is different from those cases that deny prop-
erty rights altogether: Michoff and Connell are concerned that not recognizing 
rights would “allow[] ‘one participant in a meretricious relationship to abscond 
with the bulk of the couple’s acquisitions.’”333  
Disagreements over what outcome better promotes marriage thus stem 
from opposing views regarding which individual the law should attempt to 
incentivize. While the jurisdictions that decline to recognize rights seek to in-
centivize the woman to marry, the jurisdictions that liken the relationship to a 
marriage are more concerned with removing incentives for the man not to pro-
pose. The justices’ differing views in Michoff showcase this disagreement: the 
dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning, predicting that the application of 
divorce rules to nonmarital relationships would create a “disincentive to mar-
riage” because “it gives unmarried persons the rights of community property 
without imposing upon them the mutual assumption of duties that is attendant 
to the marital status.”334 Since imposing rights and duties at the conclusion of a 
relationship would disincentivize marriage, the dissent concluded that no obli-
gations should be imposed.335  
These conflicting accounts of competing incentives protect different indi-
viduals in the relationship: the dissent’s account prevents the distribution of 
property and thereby protects the wealthier partner, generally the man, as do 
the cases that decline to distribute property at the conclusion of the relation-
ship. The majority’s account allows for the distribution of property and thereby 
benefits the poorer partner, typically the woman, once the relationship ends.   
Courts that award palimony are similarly concerned with protecting the 
status of marriage, which they do by ensuring that abstaining from marriage 
does not leave the wealthier partner with all of the assets. In upholding the 
award in Kozlowski, the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically considered 
what would better promote the institution of marriage, given that “[t]he joining 
of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive and 
individually fulfilling relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a life-
                                                                                                                           
 332 Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 (Wash. 1995). 
 333 Michoff, 840 P.2d at 1223–24; see also Connell, 898 P.2d at 836 (reasoning that “the property 
acquired during the relationship should be before the trial court so that one party is not unjustly en-
riched at the end”). 
 334 Michoff, 840 P.2d at 1229 (Springer, J., dissenting). 
 335 Id. Those seeking to avoid community property from kicking in when a relationship ends, 
however, would presumably be less inclined to marry if no obligations were imposed on them at the 
end of a relationship. 
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time.”336 The court sought to guarantee that individuals would not forego “the 
most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship” by making it 
financially unsound for the wealthier individual to not marry. It reasoned that 
refusing to recognize rights between nonmarital partners “can only encourage 
a partner with obvious income-producing ability to avoid marriage and to re-
tain all earnings which he may acquire.”337 In response, the court made it cost-
ly for him to do so. These cases therefore place less of a premium on the wom-
an’s decision to marry or not: the woman can say yes or no, and the law will 
not penalize either decision. 
C. Divorce Versus Separation 
In each set of cases, courts tend to focus on the initial decision to marry, 
and on the substance the nonmarital relationship assumes, in deciding whether 
to distribute property. The true comparison, however, is not between the course 
each relationship takes. The question before the court is whether a nonmarital 
separation should be treated like a divorce. Uncovering the actual comparison 
reveals some of the assumptions that courts make in promoting marriage at the 
relationship’s end—namely, how the rules regulating exit impact the decision 
regarding entry. 
Because these cases arise at the conclusion of the relationship, the most 
direct comparison accessible to courts is between divorce, available to married 
couples, and separation, available to unmarried couples. Only the decision to 
marry, however, remains the opinions’ explicit concern. The Illinois Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Hewitt v. Hewitt, in 1979, exemplifies the circuitous reason-
ing courts employ.338 The court in Hewitt prioritized encouraging the institu-
tion of marriage to the detriment of the individuals before it.339 The court was 
worried that distributing property at the moment of separation would sanction 
the availability of statuses other than marriage; specifically, that the “judicial 
recognition of mutual property rights” may “make that alternative to marriage 
more attractive by allowing the parties to engage in such relationships with 
                                                                                                                           
 336 Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 907 (N.J. 1979). 
 337 Id. at 908. This is not to imply that the cases that do not recognize property rights do not im-
pact the rights between couples. They do, even if the economic nature of the decision goes unstated, 
and it generally harms the woman, not the man. 
 338 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979). Hewitt was as seminal of a case as 
Marvin, for crystallizing the opposing viewpoint. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112 (Cal. 
1976) (recognizing implied contracts between unmarried couples). Illinois continues to deny cohabit-
ing couples property rights upon separation. Blumenthal, 2016 WL 6235511, at *7 (declining to rec-
ognize property rights upon separation between an unmarried couple). 
 339 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207 (“Of substantially greater importance than the rights of the imme-
diate parties is the impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage.”). 
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greater security.”340 The court, however, offered no account of how the rules 
regulating exit would impact the initial decision to marry. It only speculated 
that distributing property would “potentially enhanc[e] the attractiveness of a 
private arrangement over marriage” and contravene the recently-enacted Illi-
nois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act’s “policy of strengthening and 
preserving the integrity of marriage.”341 
Rather than assess the calculus individuals might enter into in deciding 
whether to marry given what rules are available to them when their relation-
ships end, courts assume it. The result is a guesstimate of the competing incen-
tives that may play out in the decision of whether to marry. The Hewitt court 
declined to distribute property because it reasoned that private arrangements 
may become more attractive if parties can evade the obligations imposed by 
marriage.342 The example Hewitt raised as cause for concern was that husbands 
would seek to get out of supporting their wives.343 Hewitt, however, arguably 
sanctions a very similar, if not the same, evasion—where the parties do not 
marry and the court refuses to distribute property, the defending party, almost 
always the man, succeeds in avoiding property obligations that would have 
otherwise been triggered by the decision to marry. In effect, the decisions that 
decline to distribute property impose competing incentives onto the individuals 
in the relationship, at least in considering property distribution: the man may 
seek to avoid marriage in order to retain his assets, while the woman may seek 
out that very status in order to ensure her property rights when the couple sepa-
rates. The decision to marry therefore rests on which individual has the most 
bargaining power in the relationship, and how important the rules regulating 
exit are to their initial decision.344 
The cases that decide to distribute property at the end of a nonmarital re-
lationship also impose a questionable incentive structure onto the parties in-
volved. If a nonmarital relationship can still lead to a property distribution, 
                                                                                                                           
 340 Id. at 1209. 
 341 Id. 
 342 The contours of this argument are somewhat familiar and track the original reasons for declin-
ing to recognize prenuptial agreements as promoting divorce, which have largely been discredited and 
discarded. See Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 944–46 (Ky. 1990) (abandoning the prohi-
bition against enforcement of antenuptial agreements, rejecting the argument that entering into these 
private agreements promote divorce, and identifying other jurisdictions reaching the same conclu-
sion). 
 343 Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1209 (voiding “agreements releasing husbands from their obligation to 
support their wives”). 
 344 These scenarios assume an unequal property distribution, which tracks the claims brought to 
court. This decision-making process, however, could also play out where both individuals in a rela-
tionship have relatively equal amounts of assets—doing so might just make the decision to marry even 
less relevant, insofar as it is linked to the question of property distribution at the conclusion of the 
relationship. 
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then marriage does not necessarily emerge as the preferred or promoted status 
insofar as property is concerned. Instead, the court is making the decision to 
marry neutral. That is, if the cost to the party with more assets is the same 
within marriage as it is outside of it, then so too is it to the party with fewer 
assets. The decision to marry or not to marry becomes equal at least where 
property distribution at the end is implicated, which is the scenario that all of 
these cases address. 
None of the cases that appeal to marriage promotion engage with how the 
rules regulating property distribution at the end of a relationship may impact 
the decision to marry at the outset. Nor do they consider how divorce may dif-
fer from separation in the couple’s calculus. Engaging in the comparison 
would first require the court to acknowledge that married couples divorce: if 
marriage did last forever, or if individuals and courts believed marriage lasted 
forever, then the rules regulating property division at the relationship’s end 
would presumably be less important to the initial decision, and less relevant to 
ensuring the continued existence of the institution of marriage. To decide, or 
decline, to distribute property after a separation because of the perceived im-
pact such a decision has on marriage would imply that courts understand indi-
viduals to consider options available to them when their relationship ends. By 
retaining the analysis at the level of the existing relationship, courts avoid rec-
ognizing this reality. The result is that the cases do not provide an account of 
how the rules regulating divorce measure up to those applied to a separation, 
or how either promotes marriage.  
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE LAW OF NONMARRIAGE 
Considering how courts treat nonmarital relationships when they end clar-
ifies how the law defines marriage and nonmarriage. In particular, placing 
these decisions side-by-side leads to critiques along two axes. First, this more 
complete analysis demonstrates not just that the law polices the boundaries 
between marriage and nonmarriage, but that in doing so it actively defines the 
content of each. Second, analyzing the cases together identifies the limits of 
relying on marriage in deciding whether and how to distribute property in a 
nonmarital relationship. This Part addresses each critique in turn. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive resolution, it takes 
the necessary first step of exposing the flaws with the dominant modes of legal 
reasoning. Engaging with these shortcomings provides the initial foundations 
for moving beyond the legal system’s current limitations. 
A. The Duties of Marriage and Nonmarriage 
Those cases that address nonmarital relationships through the lens of mar-
riage, and those that address nonmarital relationships on their own terms, de-
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fine the contours of all relationships that involve sex, where one of the parties 
seeks some form of property distribution at the end. In protecting the bounda-
ries of marriage, these cases supply both marriage and nonmarriage with sub-
stantive content. Understanding how the law distributes property across non-
marital relationships reveals how the space outside of marriage functions to 
perpetuate outdated norms, out of the spotlight. 
The cases that require the nonmarital relationship to be marriage-like in 
distributing property or awarding palimony are actively engaged in defining 
marriage by deciding what kind of relationship is sufficiently similar to mar-
riage to merit recognition. As such, they impose a specific, and exclusive, def-
inition of marriage. For instance, marital services include cooking and clean-
ing—but not hosting or providing companionship.345 Rather than threaten the 
institution of marriage, these cases that consider how closely nonmarital rela-
tionships resemble marriage bring the relationships directly under the aegis of 
marriage.346  
Marriage materializes as the preferred status in another way: the metric of 
marriage results in making recovery difficult for nonmarital couples where the 
relationship veers in any way from what marriage ought to look like according 
to the court, including not actually being legally married. The cases that con-
sider the termination of alimony contravene this trend by easily likening non-
marriage and marriage as long as there is proof of sex, but towards similar 
ends—restricting an individual’s property rights where the relationship was not 
marital. 
The cases that consider whether to distribute property in a nonmarital re-
lationship by opposition to marriage are also involved in defining marriage: if 
the relationship looks anything like marriage, or the services provided ap-
proach those exchanged during marriage, courts prevent the plaintiff from re-
covering. A definition of what constitutes marriage emerges from these deci-
sions, like the “wispy form of the figures of a Chagall painting”347: it generally 
involves a man who accumulates property by working outside of the home, 
and a woman who provides services inside of the home, and sometimes at 
work, if it involves her nonmarital partner. Where these marital-like services 
are completed outside of marriage, however, courts appraise them as gratui-
tous. Even where courts consider the possibility of quantifying the exchange, 
                                                                                                                           
 345 See supra notes 44–58 and accompanying text (addressing instances where courts deemed 
household services marital services). 
 346 The termination of alimony cases provides a particularly stark example of where courts col-
lapse most remaining distinctions between marriage and nonmarriage. See supra notes 105–160 and 
accompanying text. 
 347 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116 (Cal. 1976) (discussing how the rule for addressing 
nonmarital couples emerged from prior precedent). 
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they are generally offered at a discount, valued at much less than half of the 
property acquired. The only exception to this rule is where courts consider the 
parties’ intent in sharing property during the course of the relationship: in this 
context, services rendered or assets provided are valued on a more egalitarian 
basis.348 
 Although the cases employ different reasoning, and reach conflicting re-
sults, they are strikingly consistent in defining the role that the wife should 
occupy: she should provide homemaking services such as cooking, cleaning, 
and childcare. She should also expect to provide advice, as well as time and 
energy, to her husband’s business ventures.349 Last but not least, the wife 
should provide sex, which can only lead to financial support in the context of a 
marriage. Indeed, sex is limited to the province of marriage both by those cases 
that address the nonmarital relationship as marital, and by those that deny re-
covery when the relationship is understood as strictly nonmarital. Importantly, 
these cases identify sex specifically as a wifely duty, given that they arise when 
it is the woman who is having the sexual relations. In the process, courts them-
selves create the link between sex and support, a tit for tat that becomes explic-
it in the termination of alimony cases. In these situations sex becomes suffi-
cient—on its own—to provide both proof of marriage and end payments of 
support. Instead of distancing the exchange of money for sex, courts effective-
ly seal this particular deal.350 
The overarching definition of marriage that these decisions impose is one 
steeped in archetypal gender relations—it is the principal relationship status 
that provides the plaintiff, in almost every case a woman, with support. By re-
fusing to recognize the contribution of the woman on an equal basis, except in 
the few cases that consider intent, courts reinforce the notion that a woman’s 
labor within the home is either less valuable, or completely gratuitous.351 It is 
                                                                                                                           
 348 Where the court considers the intent of the parties, it tends to award the plaintiff half of the 
property at issue. See supra notes 268–284 and accompanying text (discussing how a determination of 
intent affects property distribution). 
 349 That is, in addition to taking care of the home she should “chew[] the fat with [her husband] 
over the advisability of certain business decisions.” Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 814 (Va. 
1990). She should also help “at the office and also at a new business that the [husband] established.” 
Featherston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 350 Moreover, the aversion courts proclaim to meddling in the details of a particular relationship is 
belied by their willingness to enter into the contents of an underwear drawer to determine whether a 
particular relationship should terminate alimony. See supra notes 112–145 and accompanying text 
(discussing how sexual relations factor into the determination of alimony). 
 351 Of course, this conclusion could be gender neutral if the individual doing the housework is 
male. That is exceedingly rare among these cases. 
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her duty to engage in housework, just like it was under coverture.352 Yet here, 
she is subject to these duties outside of marriage. 
Read together, these cases complete the picture of modern heterosexual 
relations: these decisions can be understood to promote marriage as a status 
that the woman in particular should seek out. When asked, the woman should 
say yes. The law regularly inflicts a penalty on the woman in a nonmarital rela-
tionship—either she cannot receive a property distribution as the plaintiff in a 
nonmarital relationship that has ended, or she stops receiving alimony pay-
ments as the defendant in a termination of alimony case for having entered a 
nonmarital relationship.353 Indeed, the law routinely protects the person who 
has more assets, given that the individual can keep nearly all of them intact at 
the conclusion of a nonmarital relationship. Because this person is generally 
the man in the cases that reach the court, these decisions essentially subsidize 
his decision not to marry. The dividing line courts etch between marriage and 
nonmarriage distinctly and quantifiably harms the woman. 
B. Beyond Marriage 
This Article has identified and categorized the different approaches courts 
take in addressing nonmarital relationships and their attendant effects. The 
thread underlying all of them is marriage—there are those that rely on mar-
riage to give it content and meaning; there are those that rely on marriage to 
distinguish it from nonmarriage. In all cases, marriage is the preferred status. 
Marriage, however, clearly falls short of guiding courts towards any par-
ticular outcome. Courts fail to agree on what best promotes marriage—whether 
it is recognizing a property distribution, or declining to do so. This question is 
especially relevant in a context where state-imposed benefits already differen-
tiate marital from nonmarital relationships. Although this Article does not en-
gage with the propriety of such regulation,354 it exposes the rather capricious 
ways courts use the nonmarital space to promote marital status. 
                                                                                                                           
 352 Hasday, supra note 32, at 845 (“Under common law coverture, a husband had a right to his 
wife’s domestic services.”). 
 353 The broader argument of whether the law should recognize care work undertaken by women is 
not the issue here—the purpose of this Article is to identify the ways in which the law denies women 
property rights by continuing to prioritize marriage as a status they should seek out, given the type 
work they have undertaken. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 
214–217 (2007) (describing the critique of feminists who value domestic care work to the exclusion of 
other type of care work performed by women). 
 354 See BOWMAN, supra note 14, at 229 (arguing for public recognition of nonmarital status); 
Aloni, supra note 43, at 607 (arguing for a registration-based marriage alternative recognized by the 
state); see also Strauss, supra note 165, at 1287–98 (presenting reasons why the state may have a 
legitimate interest in privileging the status of marriage). 
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The cases that deal with a single couple who experienced a relationship 
that was both marital and nonmarital provide unique insight into the marriage 
promotion rationale. In some instances, the court denies any legal recognition 
to the nonmarital relationship that preceded or sometimes followed a marriage. 
A central justification courts supply is that ignoring nonmarital relationships 
promotes marriage. This reason, however, becomes less meaningful in cases 
where the couple was, at some point, married. The justification also comes up 
wanting in situations where the couple never married—by denying nonmarital 
couples a property distribution to protect the institution of marriage, courts are 
effectively denying them the laws that regulate divorce. In more accurate terms 
then, the law protects and promotes the laws of divorce, by excluding unmar-
ried couples. Although there may be a reasoned basis for doing so, courts do 
not provide one. As such, they do not develop an account of how the rules reg-
ulating divorce incentivize couples to get married, as opposed to remain un-
married given the rules that regulate separation. Nor do they address how the 
cases turn marriage into a status that the woman should seek out if she expects 
compensation for sex, or homemaking services.355  
 One potential path beyond the marriage-nonmarriage dyad is to turn to-
wards friendship. Scholars have raised alternatives to the sexual-romantic rela-
tionship around which family law revolves—Katherine Franke and Laura Ros-
enbury have offered friendship as a model that may destabilize the centrality of 
marriage.356 A reliance on friendship is particularly productive in this context 
where the relationships at issue lie along a spectrum of obligations, and are 
poorly suited to an all-or-nothing approach.357 Friendship is also helpful in 
breaking away from the gendered valuation of work that takes place within the 
home and outside of marriage. Relying on friendship could mean expanding 
the types of situations in which individuals are able to seek a property distribu-
tion—beyond marriage or marriage-like relationships. It could also mean 
abandoning the court’s reliance on markers of a romantic relationship modeled 
                                                                                                                           
 355 This holds true regardless of the realities of divorce—which may very well fall short of doing 
either. 
 356 See Franke, supra note 15, at 2702–05 (proposing friendship as an alternative to marriage 
around which to organize human connection); Rosenbury, supra note 353, at 220–24 (arguing for a 
more robust recognition of friendship by rules that regulate relationships and critiquing the division 
between marriage and friendship); see also Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
631, 653–57 (2007) (identifying where the law privileges friendship and arguing that friendship 
should be further promoted throughout the law). 
 357 The turn towards intent seems promising insofar as it addresses contributions to the relation-
ship without relying on a definition, and valuation, of husband-wife roles. It is an inflexible mecha-
nism, however, and functions as a categorical cut-off point. In a relationship that has experienced 
marriage and nonmarriage, for instance, the fact of divorce serves as definitive proof of intent, leaving 
the ex-wife with nothing even after living together for numerous years. See supra notes 304–309 and 
accompanying text. 
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on marriage in determining whether property should be distributed. Courts 
would thus be free to more fully evaluate the multiple relationships before 
them, and the obligations incurred, regardless of the particular form they 
take.358 
Much work remains to be done in considering how courts can break away 
from marriage in addressing the various forms of nonmarriage.359 At the very 
least, in an era where marriage is not the only reality, the law has to do more 
than depend on marriage in deciding whether and how to assign property. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has undertaken the first and necessary step of analyzing how 
the law mediates relationships between individuals who are not married. Ra-
ther than consider how nonmarriage should be treated, this Article has identi-
fied how nonmarriage is treated—how the absence of marriage shapes courts’ 
willingness to distribute property, and what consequences these decisions bring 
about. In the process, it becomes clear that the law defines not only the content 
of various forms of nonmarriage, but also the content of marriage itself. The 
more complete, and complicated, picture of modern marital—and nonmari-
tal—relations explored in this Article provides us with the tools to evaluate the 
state of the law. It also counsels for special caution in assessing those pro-
posals that call for a more robust recognition of nonmarriage, given the legal 
regime’s current limitations. 
 
                                                                                                                           
358 See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 14, at 61 (noting that when it comes to nonmarital relation-
ships, “one size does not fit all”). 
359 The doctrine these courts apply depends on the composition of the parties before the court. It 
remains a matter of speculation how courts would respond to requests for property distribution where 
the plaintiff seeking the property is a man and the defendant protecting the property is a woman. A 
complicating factor may be the gendered division of labor which continues to exist even where the 
woman holds title to most of the assets. Turning towards friendship would thus still be productive in 
this context. 
  
 
